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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(j)(1996). This case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Notice dated June 1, 1998.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment based upon the undisputed fact that the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" was not sold in the transaction between Defendants and IHC Hospitals,
Inc.?
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding there were no disputed issues of material

fact precluding an award of summary judgment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is a legal determination and
is therefore accorded no deference on review. Instead, the trial court's ruling is reviewed
for correctness. Atcittv v. Board of Educ. of San Juan Cntv Sch. Dist. 967 P.2d 1261,
1262 (Utah App.1998). This Court must decide "whether the trial court erred in applying
the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed
issues of material fact." Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887
P2d 848, 850 (Utah 1994).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was filed in 1991 by Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.
("Rehabilitation") against Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and its general partners
("Salt Lake Knee") in Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging breach of contract and requesting
a declaratory judgment and an accounting in connection with the sale of certain business
assets by Salt Lake Knee to IHC Hospitals ("IHC") in the formation of the Sports Medicine
West joint venture. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake
Knee and against Rehabilitation in November of 1993, ruling that the sale by Salt Lake
Knee of one-half of specific business assets did not constitute a "sale" to a "third party"
within the definition of Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement between Rehabilitation
and Salt Lake Knee.
Rehabilitation appealed the initial summary judgment order, and this Court,
exercising its appellate jurisdiction on referral by the Supreme Court, reversed the
summary judgment and concluded that the sale was to a separate entity - - the new joint
venture, Sports Medicine West, which for purposes of the Termination Agreement, was a
third party. Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation. Inc. v. Salt Lake Knee and Sports
Medicine. 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1995) ("Salt Lake Knee I").
However, instead of simply overturning the summary judgment of the district court
on the only issue in the appeal and remitting the case to the trial court, this Court
proceeded to comment on other issues not before it. The opinion in Salt Lake Knee I
stated that there was only one issue left to be resolved by the trial court, namely "whether
the joint venture [Sports Medicine West] continued to operate the business under the same
2
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name." Jd. at 270.
On remand and after further discovery, a second motion for summary judgment was
filed by Salt Lake Knee before the district court on the basis that although the Termination
Agreement required a sale of it, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not one
of the business assets transferred by Salt Lake Knee to IHC in the creation of the new joint
venture, Sports Medicine West. The summary judgment motion was also premised on the
basis that on remand, the comment by this Court in Salt Lake Knee I as to the remaining
issues to be resolved in the case was obiter dicta and was not binding upon either the
parties or the district court.
On summary judgment, the district judge examined the undisputed material facts
which plainly demonstrated that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold
as part of the IHC purchase. Upon review of the appeal in Salt Lake Knee I. the district
court concluded that the issue as to the sale of the name was not the basis of the first
summary judgment and was not before this Court in the initial appeal. The trial court
further concluded that Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement between Salt Lake
Knee and Rehabilitation expressly required that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center" be sold as part of the sale. Finally, the court found that there were no disputed
material facts involved and that the name was not sold. The trial court therefore granted
summary judgment dismissing Rehabilitation's Complaint on February 10, 1998.
From the amended order on summary judgment, Rehabilitation has taken this
appeal.

3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of the case does not adequately present the facts accurately
or completely. Therefore, Appellees choose to set out their own Statement of Facts
pursuant to Appellate Rule 24(b).
1. Defendants Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., and Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D.,
P.C., were partners and principals in the partnership known as Salt Lake City Knee and
Sport Medicine (referred to collectively as "Salt Lake Knee"). (R. at 40.)
2. Salt Lake Knee maintained its primary practice and clinic on 8th Avenue in Salt
Lake City, Utah ("Eighth Avenue Clinic"), and also operated a clinic in Park City, Utah
("Park City Clinic"). See Exhibit B, fl4 to Pis.' Mem. P.&A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., annexed
hereto as Attachment "A." (R. at 695-732.)
3. Salt Lake Knee was also involved in a partnership with Dr. Russell Toronto
("Center Partnership") to operate a much smaller clinic located at 670 East, 3900 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah. ]d. This clinic was known as the "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
("Center"). Dr. Rosenberg, Dr. Paulos, and their legal entities had very little involvement
with the Center. ]dat1|5.
4. Plaintiff Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. ("Rehabilitation") entered
into a Professional Services Contract and Lease Agreement ("Professional Services and
Lease Contract") with the Center Partnership on or about September 23, 1987. (R. at
238-39.) Rehabilitation is an experienced provider of physical therapy services, and it, or
its principals, have operated numerous clinics both within the State of Utah and in
neighboring states for many years. See Deposition of Douglas B. Toole at 24-46, annexed
4
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as Attachment "B."
5. Pursuant to the Professional Services Contract, Rehabilitation operated as an
independent contractor providing physical therapy services to the Center Partnership's
patients. A copy of the Professional Services Contract is annexed as Attachment "C." (R.
at 127-41.)
6. On or about May 22, 1989, the Center Partnership and Rehabilitation mutually
agreed to terminate the Professional Services Contract, and executed a Termination and
Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") to effectuate this purpose. A copy of
the Termination Agreement is annexed as Attachment "D." (R. at 234-35.)
7. The parties agreed in the Termination Agreement that if the Center were "sold"
to a third party within two years, Rehabilitation would be entitled to one-third of that portion
of the purchase price which is attributed to good will. See Attachment "D" at 5-6.
8. The parties agreed to define in Paragraph 11, the term "sale" precisely for the
purpose of the Termination Agreement. A "sale" would exist only if a third party purchased
and acquired:
(i)

the Center's lease;

(ii)

ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center";

(iii)

all of tne equipment and other assets located at the Center; and

(iv)

all of the Center's patients and accounts receivable.

Further, Paragraph 11 provided that the purchaser must assume complete operational
control of the business and continue to operate under the same name at the same location.
The full text of Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement states:
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within
two (2) years from the date of this Agreement,
[Defendants] sell the Center to any third party,
[Plaintiff] will be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that
portion of the purchase price which is attributed
to good will. "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer
wherein the purchaser acquires and pays
consideration for all of the following:
The Center's lease on the Leased Premises,
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center, all of the equipment and other
assets located at the Center, the Center's
patients and accounts receivable, and whereby
the purchaser assumes complete operational
control of the business of the Center and
continues operating under the same name at the
same location.
See Exhibit "D" at 5-6 (emphasis added). (R. at 8-15.)
9. Rehabilitation thereupon moved from the Center, taking with it the name of its
entity, its practice, and its patients. See Exhibit "B" to Attachment "A" at H 9.
10. On May 24,1990, Appellees entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement ("IHC
Agreement") with IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("IHC") in which Appellees sold IHC an undivided
one-half interest in specific assets used in the medical practices it owned and operated at
its clinics located at 359 Eighth Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the Park City Resort
Center in Park City, Utah, and at the Center ("IHC Transaction"). Appellees and IHC then
contributed their respective one-half interests in these assets to form a joint venture called
"Sport Medicine West." (R. at 464.)
11. It is undisputed that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold
to IHC as part of the IHC Agreement. In fact, the assets sold were specifically identified

6
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in a very detailed list.

As a review of the relevant portions of the Asset Purchase

Agreement demonstrates, the name of the Center appears nowhere on the list:
1. Purchase and Sale. Seller hereby sells, transfers, and
assigns to Buyer, and hereby purchases from Seller, an
undivided one-half interest in the following described property
(collectively, the "Assets"):
(a) Personal Property and Accounts. Seller's right, title and
interest in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances,
inventory, uniforms, promotional materials, printed matters,
supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses, prepaid taxes,
prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand,
bank deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and
products thereof, records pertaining to accounts receivable,
causes of action, licenses, miscellaneous personal property,
goodwill and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, including, without
limitation, the property and items described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto (collectively, the "Personal Property and
Accounts").
(R. at 464.)

A copy of the pertinent section 1(a) of the Asset Purchase Agreement is

annexed as Attachment "E."
12.

After the IHC transaction closed, Sports Medicine West also moved from the

3900 South Center and relocated to 5848 South 200 East, Murray, Utah. Thomas
Rosenberg Depo. at 23, annexed hereto as Attachment "F."
13. On October 4,1991, Rehabilitation filed the instant action seeking a declaratory
judgment that a "sale" had occurred, and that Rehabilitation was entitled to one-third of the
value of the goodwill transferred. (R. at 2 et seq.)
14. On June 15, 1993, Salt Lake Knee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
arguing that Rehabilitation could produce no evidence that the specific requirements of a
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"sale" were met. (R. at 168 et seg.)

Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Summary

Judgment stating that all of the requirements of a "sale" were met by the IHC Agreement.
(R. at 199etseq.)
15.

The trial court granted Salt Lake Knee's motion in an Order signed on

December 6, 1993. The court ruled that a sale of only one-half of the specified business
assets to a "third party" had occurred. Rehabilitation's Counter Motion for Summary
Judgment was denied. (R. at 358-360.)
16.

On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court, ruling that the joint venture,

Sports Medicine West, constituted a "third party" under the Termination Agreement. Salt
Lake Knee I. 909 P.2d at 269. After resolving the sole issue presented on appeal, the
Court went on to comment on additional issues that were not before the Court. Specifically
the Court concluded,

in dicta, that the Termination Agreement's requirements that

consideration be paid for the Center's assets, and that the third party have complete
operational control of the Center, were satisfied. ]d_.
17. The Court then noted, again in dicta, that "according to the parties, the only
remaining issue is whether the joint venture continued operating the business under the
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." \± at 270. The statement appears without
citation. Moreover, there was nothing in the briefs or otherwise that suggested this was
the only issue left for resolution. The Court then remanded the case for determination.
18. On December 19, 1997 and after further discovery, Salt Lake Knee filed a
second Motion for Summary Judgment based primarily upon the undisputed evidence that
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold as part of the IHC Agreement
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and this issue was not resolved before or decided by this Court in the prior appeal. (R. at
691 et seg.) The issue was viewed by the trial court as squarely before it. As the trial court
noted:
THE COURT: I'm not persuaded the Court of Appeals
addressed this issue at all. I think they looked at my ruling as
far as all of the ownership being sold, and - which I said only
half of it was sold, therefore it was not a sale.
And they said it was a joint venture, and so be it. I don't
remember addressing the issue, and I don't think it was ever
raised before me, as far as the name.
I don't know this; but I probably just assumed it was sold in
there, and didn't even consider it, because I don't remember
considering a thing about it at all.
Counsel for Rehabilitation conceded that the issue was not before this Court in the prior
appeal:
MR. GREEN: Well, you know, I would submit it had not been
addressed, but again I think that there's an issue with regard
to whether the use of that name constituted a sale, regardless
of how those documents were drafted.
The transcript of the January 27, 1998 hearing on Salt Lake Knee's motion for summary
judgment is annexed as Attachment "H." See Attachment "H" at 28-29.
19. The motion for summary judgment was also based in part on the fact that no
part of the purchase price of the Center was attributable to goodwill. See Attachment "A."
20. The district court granted Salt Lake Knee's motion on the basis that the sale did
not include the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center":
THE COURT: Well, counsel, let me indicate this to you. As I
have been reading your pleadings, first of all let me indicate,
or state, that no, I don't think this issue was raised on appeal.
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I don't think this issue was raised to me on the first
motion for summary judgment. This court does not recall
any issue at all of this sort on the particular name.
I would state to you that if this had been raised on the
first instance of summary judgment, that the court
probably, unhesitatingly, would have granted the
defendant's motion, as I read the particular contract
And, from the evidence before me, the name - there's
nothing in the evidence that indicates that the name "Salt Lake
Sports Medicine" was sold as part of this contract....
And, therefore, I must grant the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on that issue.
See Attachment "H" at 38-39 (emphasis added). Rehabilitation timely filed the instant
appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the summary judgment order of the district court. After full
discovery, it is manifest that there are no genuine issues of material fact that the business
assets sold by Salt Lake Knee to the new joint venture, Sports Medicine West, did not
include the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." Paragraph 11 of the Termination
Agreement, accordingly, was not triggered by the Salt Lake Knee sale.
The name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was clearly an identifiable and distinct
asset carrying with it trade name and assumed business name rights that were retained
by Salt Lake Knee. The argument of Rehabilitation, a stranger to the IHC Transaction, that
although the business assets sold were specifically delineated in the agreements, the
name should nonetheless be implied as included as well, is a flawed argument without any
authoritative or judicial support.

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As to the issue of the sale of the name, this question was not raised and was not
before this Court in Salt Lake Knee I. Salt Lake Knee never had the opportunity of moving
forward arguing before the district court the issue of whether the sale included the name
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center," until it was presented to and decided by the district
court upon remand. The district court properly concluded that the scope of remand was
not limited by what we respectfully submit was dicta in Salt Lake Knee I. Rehabilitation,
itself, acknowledged to the district court that the issue of the name was not presented to
the district court or to this Court in the initial appeal.
Salt Lake Knee's motion for summary judgment was solidly based and the order of
the district court granting summary judgment should be affirmed herein.
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ARGUMENT
I.

REHABILITATION FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WERE ANY
GENUINE, MATERIAL FACTS AT ISSUE AND EQUALLY FAILS TO SHOW
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
A.

Rehabilitation Has Conspicuously Failed to Cite to the Court the
Controlling Paragraph of the Asset Sale Agreement and Has Miscited
the Controlling Paragraph of the Salt Lake Knee Termination
Agreement

The Appellant, Rehabilitation, does not set out the individual aspects of its argument
under separate points as envisioned by Appellate Rule 24 and typical appellate practice,
but rather mixes the issues together under a generic "Argument."

It not only fails to

address the material contractual provisions before the Court, but it inexplicably leaves out
a phrase in a critical paragraph of the Termination Agreement.
Rehabilitation focuses its argument on Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement
between Rehabilitation and Salt Lake Knee. Paragraph 11 provides that if there is a sale
of certain assets of the previous Center within two years of the date of the Termination
Agreement, Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third of the purchase price attributed to
good will. However, such a qualifying sale is only triggered if the ownership of the name
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" is, along with other specified assets, a part of the sale.
Paragraph 11 specifically reads:
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two (2) years
from the date of this Agreement, [Defendants] sell the Center
to any third party, [Plaintiff] will be entitled to one-third (1/3) of
that portion of the purchase price which is attributed to good
will. "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein the
purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all of the
following:
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The Center's lease on the Leased Premises, ownership of
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center", all of the
equipment and other assets located at the Center, the Center's
patients and accounts receivable, and whereby the purchaser
assumes complete operational control of the business of the
Center and continues operating under the same name at the
same location.
(R. at 12-13)(emphasis added).
Rehabilitation cited this paragraph to the Court in its opening Brief. See Br. of
Appellant at 7. With respect to the last sentence of Paragraph 11 dealing with what
constitutes a "sale," Rehabilitation omits the critical phrase emphasized above: "ownership
of the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" and then argues that the sale of a name
is implicit in the sale of assets of a business.
Perhaps Rehabilitation would like the clause in Paragraph 11 to read as they have
stated in their Brief, for their burden in this appeal would be substantially lighter. Whether
it was an inadvertent but "Freudian slip" on Rehabilitation's part, the fact is that the
Termination Agreement absolutely required that to trigger a "sale" under Paragraph 11, the
sale had to include "ownership of the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center'."
It is clear that when Salt Lake Knee and IHC executed the Asset Purchase
Agreement, they went to great lengths in delineating the assets that were part of the sale.
Paragraph 1(a) sets out the specific assets as to which an "undivided one-half interest"
were sold to the buyer:
1. Purchase and Sale. Seller hereby sells, transfers, and
assigns to Buyer, and hereby purchases from Seller, an
undivided one-half interest in the following described property
(collectively, the "Assets"):

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(a) Personal Property and Accounts. Seller's right, title and
interest in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances,
inventory, uniforms, promotional materials, printed matters,
supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses, prepaid taxes,
prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand,
bank deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and
products thereof, records pertaining to accounts receivable,
causes of action, licenses, miscellaneous personal property,
goodwill and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, including, without
limitation, the property and items described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto (collectively, the "Personal Property and
Accounts").
The items set out on Exhibit "A" to the Asset Sale Agreement are annexed hereto as
Attachment "E." (R. at 464.)
Although the parties went to great lengths in describing the assets being sold,
including such things as uniforms, fixtures, and supplies, the name of the previous
business, "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not listed anywhere as an asset to be
sold. There was a good reason why the name was not sold. That was because it was
made clear in the Asset Purchase Agreement that the new entity being created by Salt
Lake Knee and IHC Hospitals, into which the sold assets were transferred, carried the
name "Sports Medicine West." The Recital page reads as follows:
RECITALS:
A. Seller is engaged, and has owned assets utilized, in the
business of operating certain physical therapy and
rehabilitation facilities that are presently located at 670 East
3900 South, and 359 8th Avenue, in Salt Lake City, Utah,
(collectively the "Rehab Facilities"), and a part time medical
clinic located at the Park City Resort Center in Park City, Utah
(the "Park City Facilities").
B. Seller desires to sell, transfer, and assign, and Buyer
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desires to purchase, a undivided one-half interest in certain of
the assets used in the Rehab Facilities and the Park City
Facilities, in connection with and as contemplated by that
certain Joint Venture Agreement of Sports Medicine West of
even date herewith between Seller and Buyer (the "joint
Venture Agreement"), upon the terms and conditions set forth
herein.
See Attachment "E" at 1.
When Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement and Paragraph 1 (a) of the Asset
Purchase Agreement of the new joint venture were pointed out to the District Court,
Rehabilitation admitted that under general contract interpretation, the name of the former
business had not been included in the sale of one-half the assets to IHC. See Attachment
"H"at21, lines 12-13.

B.

Rehabilitation's Argument of an "Implied Sale of the Name" is Logically
Flawed and Unsupported By Law.

The district court below granted Salt Lake Knee's motion for summary judgment
concluding that "Plaintiff has failed to produce any competent evidence raising a genuine
dispute of material fact on the issue of whether the name '"Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center' was sold to IHC or a third party." (R. at 1005-08.) Indeed, Rehabilitation conceded
before the district court and before this court that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center" was not included in the Asset Purchase Agreement. Moreover, Rehabilitation did
not produce any evidence demonstrating that Sports Medicine West used the name "Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center" in its business operations, in advertising, billing patients,
business letterhead, or in any ordinary business transactions.
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Rather, in view of a complete lack of evidentiary support that the name was ever
sold or transferred to Sports Medicine West, Rehabilitation asks this Court to imply, as a
matter of law, a sale of the Center's name. In other words, Rehabilitation, as a third-party
stranger to the agreement between Salt Lake Knee and IHC, contends that even though
Salt Lake Knee and IHC did not include the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" in
the sale creating the new joint venture Sports Medicine West, and even though the
undisputed evidence was that Salt Lake Knee did not intend to and did not sell the name
to IHC, that the district court below, and this Court on appeal, should nonetheless imply,
as a matter of law, that the name was nonetheless sold so that Sports Medicine West,
whether it knew and intended it or not, had "ownership of the name 'Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center.'" This extraordinary non-sequitur is claimed to be based upon the theory
that (1) Utah case law holds that "good will" includes "a good name," (2) good will is
impliedly transferred in the sale of a business, and therefore (3) "a good name" is impliedly
transferred in the sale of a business.
The flaw in this twisted reasoning is manifest. To begin with, a "good name" as part
of "good will" of a business, does not mean the precise name of a business, but rather
means the good reputation or good character of the business. In fact, the very case cited
by Rehabilitation in its Brief makes this clear. In Sorenson v. Sorenson. 769 P.2d 820
(Utah App. 1989), this Court noted that good will is the '"summation of all of the special
advantages, not otherwise identifiable, related to a going concern.'" Id. at 825 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). Good will is a combination of many intangible factors, such as
reputation, clientele loyalty, and the understanding that the business is stable and has
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integrity. The name of business, by stark contrast, is an identifiable and specific asset,
protected by trade name law and the Assumed Business Name Statute, which may or may
not be sold as part of business assets. In point of fact, the name of a business, as in this
case, is often retained by the owner and not sold in the business operation.

Thus,

Sorenson does not stand for the legal proposition that the precise name of the business
is impliedly subsumed by the good will in the business.
The second flaw in Rehabilitation's premise is the assertion that the transfer of good
will of a business will axiomatically transfer the name of the business. While good will
cannot be transferred or sold apart from the business with which it is connected, Southern
Utah Mortuary v. Roger D. Olpin. 776 P.2d 945, 948 (Utah App. 1989), the transfer of good
will is a totally separate issue from the transfer of the name of the business. The latter can
be retained or transferred independently of the business, id. In point of fact, in Southern
Utah Mortuary, the exact case cited by Rehabilitation in support of its argument, the name
of the business was sold to another party prior to the sale of the business. Accordingly,
while goodwill was found to be presumably transferred, the name of the business was not.
i d at 949.
Thirdly, the fallacy of Rehabilitation's argument reaches a new level when it argues
that although the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not expressly included
among the detailed and long list of assets sold, it also was not expressly excluded.
Accordingly, Rehabilitation argues that the district court, and now this Court, should
assume that the name was impliedly transferred.

As part of this circular argument,

Rehabilitation even argues that the right to decide not to use the name Salt Lake Sports
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Medicine Center is "strong indicia of the sale of ownership of the name." There is good
reason that Rehabilitation can not point the district court below, or this Court, to a single
case or other legal authority to support this proposition. There are none.

Indeed, if

Rehabilitation's argument were accepted, there would be no limit to the terms that could
be implied or inferred into a transaction on the ground that they were not expressly
excluded.
Rehabilitation is not entitled to have this Court rewrite the Asset Purchase
Agreement regarding the sale of assets from Salt Lake Knee to IHC so that it can claim a
completely different result for purposes of its own Termination Agreement. The controlling
and unrebutted facts are that the sale of assets from Salt Lake Knee to IHC is marked by
the most specific listing of assets, such that it is rationally impossible to "imply" the transfer
of an identifiable and distinct asset such as the name of the Center. In point of law, the
cardinal rule of contract and statutory construction long recognized in Utah1 that "to
enumerate is to exclude," closes the door on Rehabilitation's argument.

In the

IHC

Transaction, substantial legal documents were generated which identified with particularity
each and every asset sold. The accurate judicial inference from the sale is that if the name
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" were a part of the sale transaction, this fact would have
been clearly set forth. There is not a scrap of evidence that would even begin to suggest

1

The Latin maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" has been part of the strong
precedent of the Supreme Court of Utah. See Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 855
(Utah 1994); Ponderosa One L.P. v. Salt Lake City Sanitary Dist. 738 P.2d 635,637 (Utah
1987); Anderson v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 737 P.2d 211, 218
(Utah 1987).
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that the name was intentionally left out of the list of assets sold in order to defeat
Rehabilitation's contention under its Termination Agreement with Salt Lake Knee. The
unblemished fact is that the new joint venture always intended to and did use the name
Sports Medicine West. See Attachment "E."
Thus, there is not only no evidence to support Rehabilitation's argument of an
implied sale of the name in the Sports Medicine West Transaction, but the evidence is
against it. "[0]nce challenged, the party who opposes such a [summary judgment] motion
must come forward with sufficient proof to support his or her claim, particularly when that
party has had an opportunity to conduct discovery." Hipwell v. IHC HOSPS., Inc., 944 P.2d
327, 339 (Utah 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct.
2548(1948)).

C.

That the Name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center May Have Remained
on a Sign on the Business Premises for a Time After the Termination
Agreement is not a Material Fact on the Issue of Whether the Sale
Included the Name.

With respect to the sale of the name, the best that Rehabilitation can do is the
argument that for some time after the IHC Transaction took place, the marquee at the 3900
South leasehold property bore the words "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." This solitary
statement comes from two physical therapists, who are not only strangers to the
Termination Agreement, but also were strangers to the "Sports Medicine West" joint
venture. As the district court noted, the fact that a party does not take down a sign, or the
prior name of a business, for a period of time, is not evidence that such name was part of
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the sale to IHC.

Where is any connecting evidence demonstrating a nexus between

leaving a sign tacked onto leased premises, and evidence that the name was sold and in
the ownership of Sports Medicine West?
This case has been pending for five years, during which Dr. Rosenberg, Dr. Paulos
and other employees of Sports Medicine West and the prior employees of Salt Lake Knee
and Rehabilitation were deposed. There is no evidence that Sports Medicine West ever
used or manifested ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" in its dayto-day business operations.

Significantly, the record is devoid of any evidence that

telephones were answered with the greeting "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center," that
letterhead existed using the name, that contracts with vendors were entered into by Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center, or that Sports Medicine West ever exercised any indicia of
ownership of the name. The fact that the marquee at 3900 South was not immediately
changed after the IHC Transaction is not a material fact and remains disconnected from
any material fact in this record. Standing alone, failure to change the marquee merely
demonstrates oversight or inadvertence as happens with many businesses.
The district court correctly concluded that Rehabilitation had not demonstrated there
were material facts at issue and, accordingly, properly granted Salt Lake Knee's motion
for summary judgment.2

Rehabilitation contends that Salt Lake Knee, prior to the instant motion for
summary judgment, had never claimed in this case that the name of "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" was not sold in the IHC Transaction. Rehabilitation is incorrect. In the
initial motion for summary judgment, Salt Lake Knee specifically raised and argued that
Rehabilitation was unable to demonstrate sale of the name. (R. at 174.)
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II.

IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO SALT LAKE KNEE, THE DISTRICT
COURT DID NOT EXCEED THE PROPER SCOPE OF REMITTITUR.
A.

Rehabilitation Expressly Conceded Thatthe Issue of Whetherthe Name
Was Sold to the Sports Medicine West Joint Venture Was Not Before
this Court on Appeal in Salt Lake Knee I.

As this Court noted in Salt Lake Knee I, the sole issue presented in that appeal was
whether the district court erred in concluding that the transfer of one-half of the business
assets of the Center to IHC was a "transfer of less than 'all' of the interest in the Center
[which] does not trigger the 'sale' definition in Paragraph 11." Salt Lake Knee I. 909 P.2d
at 269. This Court held that even though one-half of the business assets were transferred,
Sports Medicine West was a "separate legal entity" which received 'all' of the transferred
assets and, thus reversed the district court decision. Rehabilitation conceded at oral
argument before the district court that the question of whether the transaction with IHC was
"a sale" within the definition of Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement, was the only
issue before this Court. See Attachment "H" at 29.
The problem is that in the concluding paragraph of the opinion of Salt Lake Knee
i, this Court did not limit itself to the framed issue on appeal. Instead, the Court went on
to comment that the requirement in Paragraph 11 that consideration be paid for the assets
was also satisfied and that Sports Medicine West assumed full operational control of the
business assets. 909 P.2d at 270. The Court then went even a step further and observed
that there was only one issue remaining between the parties, i.e., "whether the joint
venture continued operating the business under the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center.'" id, at 270. The latter comment, it is respectfully submitted, was dicta and not the
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law of the case. While Rehabilitation has failed to raise the question of the scope of the
Court's earlier opinion as an appealable issue in this case, we believe it is appropriate to
address the issue for the benefit of the Court, nonetheless.
It is settled law in Utah that an appellate court's ruling is limited to those issues
specifically raised by the parties and addressed by the trial court, and not to those issues
which are collateral to the trial court's decision. As this Court observed in D'Aston v.
rJAston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992):
[W]hile a reversal effectively invalidates the prior judgment with
respect to those issues addressed in the appeal, it "extends
only to those issues which the appellate court decided in
actuality or by necessary implication: it does not affect
collateral matters not before the court."
Jd. at 351 (citing Ave v. Fix. 626 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Mont. 1981) (emphasis added)). The
Utah Supreme Court announced the same principle in Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
Co.. 659 P.2d 1040,1044 (Utah 1983). The respected treatise, Moore's Federal Practice,
states the rule:
The law of the case doctrine applies to an issue or issues that
have actually been decided. The doctrine does not apply to
statements made by the Court in passing, or stated as possible
alternatives.
18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.20[3] (3d ed. Matthew Bender 1997) (emphasis added).
On remand, the district court retains jurisdiction to consider issues that were not
before and/or decided by the appellate court. In Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court.
Utah County. 191 P.2d 153 (Utah 1948), a seminal decision, the Utah Supreme Court
noted the well established rule:
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As to all matters adjudicated by the appellate court, both the
trial court and the parties are foreclosed from further trying
those matters. They become the law of the case. But as to
matters left open by the appellate court, it is within the sound
discretion of the trial court to permit amended or supplemental
pleadings as to those matters.
14at 158 (emphasis added); Slattervv. Covev&Co.. 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1995)
(same). Thus,
[although the District Court owes obedience to the mandate of
the Appellate Court, it retains jurisdiction under the mandate
rule to reconsider issues on remand that were not expressly or
implicitly decided by the Appellate Court. A District Court can,
after remand, come to the same result as before remand by
reiving on grounds other than those specified in the Appellate
Court's mandate.
18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.23[1][a] (3d ed. Matthew Bender 1997) (emphasis
added).
Thus, the rule as applied in this case requires the finding that the only issue which
was before this Court in Salt Lake Knee I and on which Salt Lake Knee had been given the
opportunity to be heard was whether the sale of one-half the assets met the definition of
"sale" under Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. The trial court then proceeded
to grant Salt Lake Knee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that "there's
nothing in the evidence that indicates that the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine' was sold
as part of this contract." Id. at 39.
The one thing consistent about Rehabilitation's position is its inconsistency. On the
one hand, it contends, without analysis or reference to one single legal authority, that the
district court improperly exceeded the scope of remand by considering a different and
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subsidiary issue than the single issue identified by this Court. See Br. of Appellant at 24.
On the other hand, Rehabilitation told the district court expressly on oral argument that the
issue of whether the ownership of the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was sold
in the IHC transaction was not before and was not "addressed" by this Court on appeal.
Therefore, it could not have been decided. What Rehabilitation argued to the district court
was that the use of the name somehow "constitutes a sale, regardless of how those
documents [the Joint Venture Agreement and the Asset Purchase Agreement] were
drafted." See Attachment "H" at 29.
The issue of whether the ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center"
was sold so as to trigger Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement was clearly not
decided by the trial court in the initial motion for summary judgment and it was not before
this Court in the prior appeal. Thus, the district court below correctly considered the issue
of whether Sports Medicine West purchased as an asset, the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center." Summary judgment was properly granted and should be affirmed by this
Court.

B.

A Holding that the Issue of the Ownership of a Name Was Decided by
this Court in the First Appeal Would Present a Serious Constitutional
Due Process of Law Problem as to Salt Lake Knee.

One of the difficulties facing Rehabilitation is the constitutional argument that, prior
to the second motion for summary judgment, Salt Lake Knee had never been heard on the
question of whether the sale to the joint venture, Sports Medicine West, included
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." Rehabilitation expressly
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argued to the district court that the issue involving the sale of the name "just came up in
this motion for summary judgment for the first time, within 30 days." See Attachment "H"
at 36. In point of fact, Salt Lake Knee did raise that issue, among others, in the first motion
for summary judgment. (R. at 174.) The district judge never reached the issue in initially
granting the summary judgment motion and its ruling was squarely based on the
conclusion that the sale of one-half of the assets from Salt Lake Knee to IHC did not
constitute a sale of all the assets under Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement.
Thus, Salt Lake Knee, prior to the February 1998 summary judgment order from
which this instant appeal is taken, has never had the name issue adjudicated and resolved
by the district court, the court of general jurisdiction.

If somehow the issue were

adjudicated in the Salt Lake Knee I appeal process without being heard in an evidentiary
court of record, there would be a denial of due process of law. See In re Estate of Frank
Veroni. No. 97-L-119, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6365 at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. December 31,
1998) ('"For more than a century the central meaning of due process has been clear:
"Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.

) (citing Baldwin v. Hale,

68 U.S. 223, 1 Wall. 223, 233 , 17 L.Ed. 531)(1863) (citation omitted)).
The constitutional question of due process makes the argument all the more
compelling that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in concluding
that the sale to Sports Medicine West did not, under the undisputed material facts, include
the prior name, so as to trigger Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement.
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C.

The Issue of "Scope of Remand" Should Not Be Addressed by this
Court Because Rehabilitation Failed Entirely to Comply with Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 24.

Rehabilitation argues in a casual and conclusory fashion that the district court went
"well beyond the scope of remand" in reaching the issue of whether the name of the Center
was sold. See Br. of Appellant at 15, 24. There are strong jurisprudential reasons for
declining to reach the issue of the scope of remand in this appeal.
First, Rehabilitation did not list this issue in its "Statement of Issues on Appeal."
Consequently, in violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5), Rehabilitation
failed to set forth a standard of review for this issue, and failed to make any citations to the
record indicating where this issue was preserved for appeal below. Second, in violation
of Rule 24(a)(9), Rehabilitation's Brief fails to present "the contentions and reasons of the
Rehabilitation with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court." Third, Rehabilitation also fails to cite a single case
or other relevant authority in support of its position, in violation of Rule 24(a)(9) and (e).
Thus, Rehabilitation has failed to comply with the basic requirements of Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 24 with respect to this issue. Under these circumstances, the Utah
Supreme Court has consistently declined to address the issue presented. See MacKav
v. Hardy, No. 970251,1998 WL 853976 at *6-7 (December 11,1998) (declining to reach
issues when brief fails to cite appellate standard of review, and fails to include legal
argument or precedent); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1997)
("Valcarce's brief on appeal contains little analysis on this point. There is no reference to
legal authority in support of his contention, and no citation to the record
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Because of

inadequate analysis, we decline to address Paul Valcarce's claim on appeal."); State v.
Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address issue where "brief wholly
lacks legal analysis and authority to support. . . argument").
D.

Alternatively, The Issue of Continued Use of Name Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center Was Necessarily Predicated upon a Determination that
the Name was Sold.

Even if the trial court somehow were limited to determination of the issue of whether
the joint venture continued to operate the business under the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center," it does not follow that the trial court would be precluded from first
considering the interrelated issue of whether the name was sold to Sports Medicine West
joint venture. Both ownership of the name and use of the name were required in order to
create a sale under paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. There is a logical nexus
and interdependency between the two. It would be unlawful for the joint venture to operate
the business under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" unless it had been
determined that the name had been sold.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above this Court should affirm in all respects the judgment
of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake Knee dismissing the
case.
Respectfully submitted,

SHELEIGH A. CHALKLEY
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

March 29, 1999.
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
;PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
jvs.
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
^MEDICINE, a Utah general
Ipartnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
JM.D., P.C., a Utah
'professional corporation and
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D.,
P.C, a Utah professional
corporation, general partners,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 910906316 CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Defendants, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine Center,
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C, and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C.
(the "Defendants") , respectfully submit this Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
• ' 1.

On or about May 22, 1989, Plaintiff and Defendant Salt

Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine entered into a Termination
Agreement and Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") which,
among other things, terminated a Professional Services Contract
and Lease Agreement entered into on or about September 23, 1987
between Plaintiff and Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center. Complaint
f6; Amended Answer f7. A true and correct copy of the Termination
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" the terms of which are
incorporated herein by this reference.
;|

2.

Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement provides in

pertinent part as follows:
I

11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that
if within two (2) years from the date of this
;{'"
Agreement, Physicians [Defendant, Salt Knee &
h
Sports Medicine] sells the Center [Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center] to any third party,
||
Rehabilitation [Plaintiff Salt Lake Knee and
!
Sports Rehabilitation,
Inc.]
shall be
11
entitled to one-third (1/3) of that portion
j
of the purchase price which is attributable
J
to good will. "Sale" shall be defined as a
|
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and
j
pays consideration for all of the following:
the Center's lease on the leased premises,
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center," all of the equipment and
other assets located at the Center, and the
Center's patients and accounts receivable,
and whereby the purchaser assumes complete
operational control of the business of the
Center and continues operating under the same
name at the same location.
3.
On or about May 24, 1990, defendant Salt Lake City Knee
and Sports Medicine entered intoiian Asset Purchase Agreement with
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IHC Hospitals, Inc.

(the "IHC Agreement").

Complaint, «R8;

Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 110, ATTACHED HERETO AS Exhibit "B".
4.

Pursuant to the IHC Agreement, Salt Lake City Knee and

Sports Medicine sold to IHC a one-half interest in the medical
practices it owned and operated at its clinics at Eighth Avenue in
Salt Lake City; at 3900 South, and also at Park City, together
;with certain related assets.

The other one-half interest was

conveyed to a joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee
•and Sports Medicine Center, known as Sports Medicine West.
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 110.
•I

5.

Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg had a very small practice at

ij

J3900 South.

It was a fraction of their 8"h Avenue practice.

In

Mconnection with the sale to IHC, a one-half (1/2) interest in
certain equipment of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was sold
Mto IHC. However, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was
jinot among the assets sold to IHC or conveyed to Salt Lake Sports
I Medicine Center.
6.

Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 5510 and 11.

IHC did not seek to acquire the name "Salt Lake Sports

Medicine Center"; it did not pay any consideration for the
acquisition thereof;

and it did not purchase or acquire that

name, or any interest therein. Further, Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center and Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center did not sell
to IHC or convey to the Sports Medicine West any interest in the
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center."

Dr. Paulos Affidavit at

111; Deposition of Greg Gardner at 41-44, attached hereto as
iii
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Exhibit "C".; Deposition of Douglas Toole at 85, attached hereto
as Exhibit lfD".
7.

No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire

assets of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center were attributed to
the good will.

Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 515, attached here as

Exhibit "B".
8.

IHC paid $662,225.00 to acquire a one-half interest in

the clinics and practices owned and operated by Dr. Lonnie Paulos
and Dr. Thomas Rosenberg, and their entities on Eighth Avenue and
in Park City and certain assets of Salt Lake City Knee and the
Salt Lake Sports Medicine and the Sports Medicine Center which
^operated at 3900 South and in consideration of the non-competition
.agreement signed by Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg, the multiples paid
|by IHC was for the non-competition

agreement.

Dr. Paulos

iI

I-Affidavit at f12-15, attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
ij

!j

9.

When

the

lease

with

Salt

Lake

Knee

and

Sports

^Rehabilitation, Inc. at 3900 South was terminated on May 22, 1989
j Gregory Gardner, Douglas Toole and their entity Salt Lake Knee and
[sports Rehabilitation, Inc., took their patients and relocated
! I their

practice,

continuing

their

rehabilitation

practice.

Deposition of Gregory Gardner at 39-40, attached hereto as Exhibit
10.

On or about October 9, 1991 the Plaintiff Salt Lake

Sports Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, an entity owned by Gregory
Gardner and Douglas Toole, filed an action against the Defendants

iv
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Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and Dr. Lonnie Paulos, M.D.,
P.C. and Thomas Rosenberg, M.D., P.C. to recover one-third of the
good will attributable to the sale certain of assets of the Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center to IHC.
11.

On or about June 15, 1993, Defendants filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment on the basis that no sale of all of the
:,assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was made to a third
party that assumed complete operational control of the business of
I the Center.
12.

This Court granted summary judgment by Order dated

December 6, 1993.
ij

13. By Order dated March 14, 1994, this Court granted

^Reconsideration and affirmed Summary Judgment.

ii

.

ij

.

..

14. Plaintiffs appealed this Court's decision to the Utah

I

11Court of Appeals.

By Opinion filed December 21, 1995, the Court

||

jjof Appeals reversed summary judgment on a narrow basis.

It held

j i

jjthat the sale of certain assets by Salt Lake Sports Medicine
I Center was a sale to a "third party" within the meaning of
paragraph 11. Court of Appeals Slip Opinion at 5.
I

15. The Appellate Court's rationale was that one-half of the

interest was sold to IHC, a third party, and Salt Lake Knee and
Sports Medicine transferred the other half to a joint venture
known

as

determined

Sports
was

a

Medicine
separate

West, which
legal

the

entity.

determined the sale was to a third party. Id.
v
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Appellate

Court

Consequently,

it

16. The issue of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center" was ever sold by Defendants to IHC or Sports Medicine West
was not raised by the prior summary judgment motion nor was it an
issue before the Court of Appeals, and consequently was not
decided by the Court of Appeals.
17.

The Court of Appeals also did not determine whether the

joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee and Sports
Medicine continued operating the business under the name "Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center."
J

18. Neither did the Appellate Court consider or determine

what, if any, portion of the purchase price paid for the certain
jof the assets of the Center were attributable to good will.
i

ARGUMENT

;!

This case can and should be disposed of by summary judgment,
N
;|as a matter of law for two unavoidable reasons, not previously
II .
.
jraised in this case nor considered or disposed of by the Court of
i!
MAppeals:
I

1.

The provisions of paragraph

! Agreement are triggered only

11 of the Termination

if the name "Salt Lake Sports

j Medicine Center" were sold to a third party. But that name was
not sold to IHC, Sports Medicine West, or any other third party.
Consequently, there is no liability.
2.

No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire

certain assets from Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine Center
were attributed to good will.

Because no consideration was paid

1
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to acquire good will, plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery.
As set forth below, the interpretation of these contract
provisions is strictly a legal question properly resolved by
summary judgment. Moreover, discovery is now concluded, and there
are no disputed facts affecting these issues.

Consequently,

summary judgment should be entered as a matter of law.
I

.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE LEGAL ISSUES PROPERTY RESOLVED BY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This Court should grant summary judgment when the record
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
•jthat the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law"
jUtah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Indeed the Utah Supreme Court has declared

Ithat summary judgment shall be rendered under these circumstances:
,i
jj
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
JI
Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered
i
if the record demonstrates that "there is no
ji •
genuine issue as to any material fact and
I
that the moving party is entitled to
!
judgment as a matter of law.
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
Suummary judgment serves a salutary purpose in promoting
judicial efficiency and avoiding unnecessary trials by permitting
the parties to pierce the pleadings and determine whether there
Mare genuine issues to present to the fact finder.
A major purpose of summary judgment is to
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine
whether there is a genuine issue to present
2
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to the fact finder. In accordance with this
purpose, specific facts are required to show
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
The allegations of a pleading or factual
conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of fact.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Lundgrenr 692 P.2d 776, 779
(Utah 1984); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d at 1172 (Utah 1983)(a major
of purpose of summary judgment

is to allow the pierce the

pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact).
Even, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between

the parties will

not

defeat

an otherwise properly

supported motion." Anderson v. Liberty Lobbyr Inc.f 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986) (emphasis by Court).

Instead, summary judgment is

mandated if "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion
j...party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
.'existence of an element essential to that parties case, on which
iI

11 that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp.
siv. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
11

In

moving

for

summary

judgment,

the

movant

need

not

i

! affirmatively demonstrate the absence of elements critical to the
| Plaintiff"s case.

Instead, the non-moving party has the burden

| to

with

come

forward

evidence

demonstrating

the

I requirements of its case.
J

[W]e do not think the Adickes language
quoted above should be construed to mean
that the burden on the party moving for
summary judgment to produce evidence
showing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact, even with respect to
an issue on which the non-moving party
3
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elemental

bears the burden of proof. Instead, as
we have explained, the burden on the
moving party may be discharged by
"showing" — that is, pointing out to the
District Court — that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
There are no disputed issues of fact on either of the grounds
on which this summary judgment motion is based.

The issues

presented are contract issues. The contract language is clear and
unambiguous and speaks for itself.
as a matter of law.

Consequently, it is construed

Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,

658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983):
The interpretation of a contract is a
question of law, to be decided by the judge,
.

. .

More importantly, our recent cases hold that
even the resolution of contract ambiguities
is a question of law for the court.
For

that

reason,

summary

judgment

is

a

particularly

appropriate and helpful tool in this contract litigation. Indeed,
the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the use of summary
judgment in contract cases.
When the existence of a contract and the
identity of its parties are not in issue and
when the contract provisions are clear and
complete, the meaning of the contract can
appropriately be resolved by the court on
summary judgment.
Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).

4
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i

II.
THE NAME "SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER"
WAS NEVER SOLD TO IHC OR SPORTS MEDICINE WEST.
Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement is the operative
provision that determines and specifies under what circumstances
plaintiff was entitled to any payment in the event Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center was sold to a third party.

That provision

provides in pertinent part:
It is agreed that if within two (2) years
from the date of this Agreement, [defendant
Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center]
sells the [Salt Lake Sports Medicine] Center
to any third party, [plaintiff, Salt Lake
Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.] shall
be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that
portion of the purchase price which is
attributable to good will.
(Paragraph 11 then defines the term "sale" as it is used in that
;(paragraph.

It specifies that a "sale" does not occur unless the

:i
i j

I name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" is sold to the third party.
||
I

"Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein
the purchaser acquires and pays consideration
for all of the following: . . . ownership of
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center,"
....[emphasis added]
The fact that ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports

I Medicine Center" was never sold to IHC or the joint venture,
Sports Medicine West, is undisputed.

Plaintiff, through one of

its partners and principals, Douglas Toole, admitted in his
deposition that he doesn't know whether the name Salt Lake City
Sports Medicine Center was sold to IHC or Sports Medicine West.
Toole Deposition at 85, attached as Exhibit
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lf

D".

Mr. Toole's

business associate, and the President of Plaintiff, Salt Lake Knee
and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., Gregory Gardner, concedes the
same fact.

He testified in his deposition that Plaintiff is not

entitled to any recovery unless the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" is sold to a third party. He then admitted that
he is not aware of any document or writing indicating the name
i"Salt Lake

Sports Medicine

Center" was

sold.

G.

Gardner

Deposition at 41, attached as Exhibit "C."
Q.

|
i
|
J
I
I

A.
Q.

A.

And in order for this paragraph 11 [of
the Termination
Agreement] to be
triggered, it is true, is it not, that
your understanding that the name Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center had to be
sold the third party and used by the
third party after the sale?
That's correct.
Now, can you point to any document or
writing in which you are aware that the
name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
was sold by Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center to IHC as part of the transaction
that followed in May of 1990?
No, I couldn't tell you that.

G. Gardner Deposition at 41.
Consequently, Plaintiff had no factual basis to dispute the issue
of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine" was sold.
In striking contrast, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, a
principal in Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and a partner in
Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center, eliminates all doubt on the
issue.

He testifies that the Defendant, Salt Lake City Knee and

Sports Medicine, never sold the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
5
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Center" or otherwise conveyed that name to IHC, Sports Medicine
West, or any other third party:
11.

Neither the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" nor any interest
therein was sold or otherwise conveyed
to IHC or any third party.

Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at Jll.
These facts are uncontested and discovery is now closed.

By

the express terms of the contract, plaintiff's entitlement to onethird

(1/3) of that portion of the purchase price which is

attributable to good will arises only if the sale of the name
."Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" occurred.
not

occur,

plaintiffs

have

no

right

Because that sale did
to

any

recovery.

Consequently, the Court can and should determine as a matter of
illaw that the provisions of paragraph 11 relied on by Plaintiff are
Hnot triggered.

For that reason, summary judgment is mandated as

ija matter of law.
I

"III.

I
|

NO PORTION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IS
ATTRIBUTED TO GOODWILL,
A second basis for summary judgment exists that was not

previously raised or addressed by the Court of Appeals. Under the
controlling language of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement,
Plaintiff is entitled to a recovery only if some portion of the
purchase price paid for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
assets is attributed to goodwill.

Discovery is concluded and the

record is now clear, and without dispute, that no portion of the
6
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purchase price for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center assets was
attributed to good will.
The deposition testimony of Greg Gardner and Douglas Toole,
the principals of plaintiff, demonstrates unequivocally that they
have no personal knowledge or information that any portion of the
purchase price paid by IHC to acquire assets of the Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center were attributed to good will.

Toole

Deposition at 88. Mr. Toole testified he doesn't know, and has no
idea what portion of the purchase price was attributable to
goodwill.
Because the principal of the Plaintiff, has admitted he has
no knowledge or information concerning whether any goodwill was
;|allocated to the sale of assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine
•Center, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, the principal of the
i!

jlentity selling the assets, stands uncontroverted and undisputed.
NDr. Paulos testifies and confirms that no portion of the purchase
|'price received from IHC was attributed to goodwill.
i j

|
I
I
|
I
I

I

12. IHC did not identify or value any goodwill
associated with any assets in which it
acquired an interest from Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center, nor did it allocate any
portion of the $662,225.00 purchase price to
goodwill associated therewith.
13. As part of the Asset Purchase Agreement
with IHC, Dr. Rosenberg and I were required to
sign a non-competition agreement pursuant to
which we agreed that we would not compete with
IHC or with the medical practices being
purchased by IHC from us.
14. I was principally involved in negotiating
the Asset Purchase Agreement with IHC. It was
7
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my intent and understanding in negotiating and
executing that agreement that any multiples
paid by IHC to acquire an interest in
practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I maintained
at the aforesaid clinics, and any related
assets, was in consideration for the patients
and practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I
maintained at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and the
Park City Clinic and for the execution by us
of the aforesaid non-competition agreement.
15. No part of the purchase price paid by IHC
to acquire an undivided one-half interest in
the practices and clinics maintained and
operated by Dr. Rosenberg and me were
allocated to any goodwill involving the Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center.
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 5112-15.
It is undisputed: No portion of the purchase price, was
Mattributed to good will. Consequently, Plaintiff is not entitled
i !

11to any recovery.

It is that simple.

Because there is no genuine

jjdispute on any material issue of fact with respect to this issue,
11 summary judgment can and should be entered as a matter of law.
II

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants respectfully
move the Court for its Order granting summary judgment dismissing
the above-captioned matter as a matter of law.
DATED this ^ r ^ a y of December, 1997.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

ROBERT S.

CAMPBSUU^SK;—'^—\

KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON
Attorneys for Defendants
8
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'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of
Civil

Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

DEPENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OP POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon:
John C. Green, Esq.
Kim M. Luhn, Esq.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid.
DATED this^j^C day of December, 1997.
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TERMINATION AGREEMENT
AND
PURCHASE AGREEMENT
Agreement dated this

'ff/^day of

1989, between Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation"} , and Salt Lake
City Knee 6 Sports Medicine (hereinafter referred to as
•physicians")•
WHEREAS Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
(hereinafter referred to as "Medicine") and Rehabilitation
entered into a Professional Services Contract and Lease Agreement dated September 23, 1987 (hereinafter referred to
as the "Agreement"); and
WHEREAS Medicine gave to Rehabilitation a Notice
of Termination dated January 19, 198 9 pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement; and
WHEREAS Physicians is the successor in interest to
Medicine; and
WHEREAS Rehabilitation desires to sell to
Physicians and Physicians desire to purchase from
Rehabilitation certain equipment owned by Rehabilitation and
currently located at the office of Rehabilitation at 670
East 3 900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah;
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual
covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as
follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-21.

Termination,

The Agreement is hereby

terminated effective April 19, 1989, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 13 of that Agreement, which by its
terms survives the termination of the Agreement.
2.

Vacation of Premises,

Rehabilitation shall

vacate the premises at 6 70 East 3 900 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises")
which is the subject of the Agreement, no later than Sunday,
April 23, 1989 at 12:00 Midnight.
3.

Release of Claims.

The parties hereto hereby

release each other and their predecessors in interest and
principals for all claims and liability to each other
arising out of the Agreement or the parties' performance
thereunder, except for any claims arising out of paragraph
11 and paragraph 13 of the Agreement, which claims are
specifically reserved by the parties.
4.

Sale of Equipment.

Rehabilitation hereby

sells to Physicians and Physicians hereby purchase from
Rehabilitation that equipment owned by Rehabilitation and
currently located at the "Leased Premises" which is set
forth in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein
by reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Equipment").
5*

Purchase Price.

The purchase price for the

Equipment shall be Thirty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred and
Twenty-Nine Dollars ($3 3,929.00) and shall be paid to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3Rehabilitation by Physicians in cash at the time of Closing,
subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 below.
6.

Payment of Costs in Connection with Granite

School District High School Sports Medicine Program,

In

addition to the purchase price for the Equipment, Physicians
shall pay to Rehabilitation at Closing, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 7 below, the sun of Six Thousand
Dollars ($6,000.00)/ which represents reimbursement to
Rehabilitation for costs incurred by Rehabilitation in
connection with Rehabilitation's participation in Medicine's
Granite School District High School Sports Medicine Program.
7.- Liens and Encumbrances.

It is understood by

the parties that the Equipment is encumbered by a security
interest held by West One Bank (as successor in interest of
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company) to secure payment of a
current balance owing of Forty-One Thousand Three Hundred
Eighty-One and 37/100 dollars ($41,381.37).

In addition, it

is understood that the Equipment, as well as certain
equipment previously sold by Rehabilitation to Physicians
(in approximately September of 1987) is encumbered by a
security interest held by Capital City Bank (as successor in
interest of Union Bank).

Rehabilitation shall insure that

those encumbrances are cleared and released in connection
with the purchase hereunder.

In that regard, it is

understood that at Closing the payments to be made to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-4Rehabilitation shall be paid jointly to Rehabilitation and
West One Bank.

Rehabilitation shall then use those funds

together with such of its own funds as necessary to
immediately pay off the amount owing to West One Bank and
procure and have filed a termination of West One's security
interest against the Equipment.

It is anticipated that the

parties will together proceed directly from the Leased
Premises to the West One Bank on the day of Closing to make
certain that the above-described procedure is accomplished.
8.

Closing. Closing shall occur at the Leased.

Premises at a time mutually agreeable to the parties, but in
no event later than Friday, May 5, 1989 at 5:00 p.m.

At

closing, Physicians or their representative shall take a
physical inventory of the Equipment.

At closing,

Rehabilitation shall provide to Physicians written
verification from Capital City Bank (as successor in
interest to Union Bank) that any liens or security interests
that entity may have against the Equipment and against any.
equipment Physicians or its partners may have previously
purchased from Rehabilitation (including without limitation
the physical therapy equipment located at 3 59 8th Avenue
which was purchased in approximately September of 198 7) have
been terminated.

Upon verification of the presence of each

item of Equipment, and upon receipt of the verification
required above, Physicians shall deliver to Rehabilitation a
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-5*
check made payable to Rehabilitation and West One Bank for
the entire purchase price of the Equipment together with the
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above.
9.

Warranties,

Rehabilitation warrants that it

owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances
except those referred to in paragraph 7 above, and has the
right to sell the same.

Rehabilitation further warrants

that all of the Equipment shall at the time of Closing be in
good working condition and free from defects,
10.

Coin Toss Regarding Murray High School.

Physicians and Rehabilitation acknowledge' that pursuant to
paragraph 13 of the Agreement, the right to be involved in a
Sports Medicine program at high schools which became a part
of Medicine's High School Sports Medicine Program after the
effective date of the Agreement would be determined by a
toss of the coin.

The parties agree that Murray High School

fits into that category, and the parties therefore agree
that at Closing a coin toss shall be conducted between
Physicians and Rehabilitation, with the winner of that coin
toss having the sole right to conduct a Sports Medicine
Program at Murray High School, free from competition from
the loser of that coin toss.
11.

Purchase of Center.

It is agreed that if

within two (2) years from the date of this Agreement,
Physicians sells the Center to any third party,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that
portion of the purchase price which is attributed to good.
will.

"Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein the

purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all of the
following:

The Center's lease on the Leased Premises,

ownership of the name "Sale Lake Sports Medicine Center,'
all of the equipment and other assets located at the Center,
the Center's patients and accounts receivable/ and whereby
the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the
business of the Center and continues operating under the
same name at the same location.
12.

Binding Agreement.

This Agreement shall be

binding on and inure to the benefit of the parties, and
their heirs, successors, and assigns.
13.

Time.

Time is of the essence of this

Agreement.
**•

Attorneys Fees.

Should any party default in

or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay all
costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees,
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-7which may a c c r u e from e n f o r c i n g t h i s Agreement, or

in

p u r s u i n g any remedy p r o v i d e d h e r e u n d e r , or by a p p l i c a b l e
law.
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC.
By :-'*t<
Its

s: =Sr

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah P a r t n e r s h i p
By LONNIE E. PAULOS^ M . D . , I n c .
a Profession^l^/C^rpora^fon,
General
By.
Laaale/E^Paulo's,

Pres.

By THQtfAS-D. FOSENEERG, M.D., p.C.
a Professional Corporation,
' General Partner
^
Ihtoas D. Roser±erg

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n
Exhibit "A".

t
PHYSICAL THERAPY EQUIPMENT •
3900 SOUTH CLIHIC

i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
!

EQUIPMENT AT 70*
LEG CURL
SMITH MACHINE (SQUAT)
CROSSOVER {PULLEY SYSTEM)
COMPUTEROW
LEG PRZSS
TOTAL BIP
METTLE* ULTRASOUND
MULTIPLEX STIMULATOR
SCOTSMAN ZCZ MACHINE
PITROK CYCLE
ME3M2TRIC XT-1000
EXAM TABLES (6 f $250 EA.)
CHATTAROCA XSTELSCT STIM
KYDROCOLLATCR HOT PACE
WHIRLPOOL
MIXING VALVE
CAST COTTERS
TOTAL:

PURCHA SE
PRICE
1,217 .00
1,145 .00
1,592 .CC
1.299 .00
1.550 .CO
1,411 .00
907 .00
1,677 .00
1,092 .00
907 .00
2.058 .00
1,050 .00
1.530 .00
€30 .00
80S .00
263 .00
161 .00
18,874 .00

EQUIPMENT t 30*
• LEG SXTE39Z01T
SEATSS CHEST PRESS
PULLOVER
AB CRUNCH
XIR COM
SAKI GRI3DER
SARDDURE
TOTAL:

521..00
794,.00
894..00
405..00
8.646..00
101..00
105. CO
11,466..00

OPPICS EQUIPMENT 9 70*
ZSOTEC PSOKSS (4 f 270]
IBM WBSELHRITER
AMANO TIMS CLOCK
TYPEWRITER STARD
PILE CASIKETS {2 £ 480J
POOT STOOL
WAITIXC ROOM SOFA (1/2)
LUNCHROOM TABLE
LCMCHROCM CHAIRS - 4
MICROWAVE
CHAIRS (3 * 154}
DESK
TOTAL;

756. 00
490. 00
210. 00
32. 00
672. 00
25. 00
229. 00
56. 00
23. 00
70. 00
462. 00
559. 00

00
3.539.
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation and
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D.,
P.C, a Utah professional
corporation, general partners,

AFFIDAVIT OF
LONNIE E. PAULOS

Civil No. 910906316 CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

;State of Utah

)
ss.
ICounty of Salt Lake )
|

I,

Lonnie E. Paulos, being first duly sworn depose and state

!as follows:
i
j
1.
I am a physician duly licensed in the state of Utah
Digitized by the
Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
!specializing
inHoward
theW. Hunter
areaLawof
orthopedics.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

I am a principal in the professional corporation known as

Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C.
!•'.
:

3.

At all time, material hereto, my professional corporation

has been a partner and principal in the partnership known as Salt
Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine, along with the professional

;."corporation of Dr. Thomas Rosenberg, known as Thomas D. Rosenberg,
I'M.D. , P.C,|

4.

Dr. Rosenberg and I, and our entity Salt Lake Knee and

Sports Medicine maintained our primary practice and clinic in the
medical building adjacent to the LDS Hospital on 8:~ Avenue in Salt
Lake City (the "Eight Avenue Clinic"). We also maintained a clinic
:in Park City ("Park City Clinic").
5.

Dr. Rosenberg and I and another physican, Dr. Russell

Toronto, were involved in a partnership known as the Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center.

The partnership operated a clinic located

: at 3900 South ("the 3900 South Clinic").

That clinic was primarily

i !

joperated by Dr. Russell Toronto.
^entities, had very

Dr. Rosenberg and I, and our

little involvement

therewith and did not

jmaintain a significant practice at the 3900 South Clinic.
jj

6.

On or about September 23, 1987, Salt Lake Sports Medicine

!i

jjCenter leased space at 3900 South to Salt Lake Knee and Sports
i'Rehabilitation, Inc., whose principals were Gregory Gardner and
!!

jjDouglas T o o l e .

|j
jj

7.

The

!(relationship.

relationship

was

strictly

a

landlord/tenant

Neither Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation,

I Inc., Digitized
Gardner,
Toole,
nor
employee
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library,any
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, or
BYU. agent thereof was a
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iI

principal, shareholder, partner, employee, agent, or representative
of Salt Lake Sports Medicine, or of Dr. Rosenberg or me, or any
entity of which we were a part.
:'

8.

On or about May 22, 1989, the lease of Salt Lake Knee and

Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. at 3900 South was terminated
agreement

pursuant

Agreement

of that same date.

Agreement and

to

a

Termination

Agreement

and

by mutual
Purchase

Pursuant to that Termination

Purchase Agreement certain equipment of Salt Lake

Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., were acquired by Salt Lake
Knee and Sports Medicine.
9.

However, Gregory Gardner, Douglas Toole and their entity

Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine, Inc., took with them the
name of their entity, their patients, and their practice, and
relocated to another location.
10.

Pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement dated May 24,

1990, Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine sold to IHC Hospitals,
•Inc., ("IHC") a one-half (1/2) interest in the medical practice
maintained by Dr. Rosenberg and me, at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and
ithe Park City Clinic.

We also sold to IHC a one-half interest in

'certain assets and equipment maintained at the 3900 South Clinic. !
!;The practice that we maintained at that location was very small,
jiand the practice of Dr. Russell Toronto, which was the primary
ijpractice operated at 3900 South Clinic was not sold to IHC.
M
i!
11. Neither the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" nor
i i

j|

.{

jiany i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n was sold or otherwise conveyed t o IHC or any
IIthird pDigitized
a r t y .by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

II
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12.

IHC did not identify or value any goodwill associated

iwith any assets in which it acquired an interest from Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center, nor did it allocate any portion of the
$662,225.00 purchase price to goodwill associated therewith.
13.

As part of the Asset Purchase Agreement with IHC, Dr.

Rosenberg and I were required to sign a non-competition agreement
'pursuant to which we agreed that we would not compete with IHC or
with the medical practices being purchased by IHC from us.
14.

I was principally involved in negotiating the Asset

Purchase Agreement with IHC. It was my intent and understanding in
negotiating and executing that agreement that any multiples paid by
IHC to acquire an interest in practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I
maintained at the aforesaid clinics, and any related assets, was in
consideration for the patients and practices that Dr. Rosenberg and
I maintained at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and the Park City Clinic
and for the execution by us of the aforesaid non-competition
, agreement.
15.

No part of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire an

;undivided one-half interest in the practices and clinics maintained
and operated by Dr. Rosenberg and me were allocated to any goodwill
:involving the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center.
DATED this / (

day of December, 1997.

LONNIE E. PAULOS
/

S

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
December, 1997.

NOTARY PUBLIC^

My Commission E x p i r e s :

<~^\);) 272t EAST V;;LLOV^;LU; u,.
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(~f~i>-

~day

of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and that
in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
LONNIE E. PAULOS was served upon:
John C. Green, Esq.
Kim M. Luhn, Esq.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by Hand-Delivery on this
day of December, 1997.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

* *

SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC.,
fka PROFESSIONAL THERAPY
INC.,

CERTIFIED COPY

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 910906316CN

vs .

Deposition of:

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE &
SPORTS MEDICINE, a Utah
general partnership,
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C.,
a Utah professional
corporation, general
partners,

GREGORY J. GARDNER
V O L U M E

II

Defendants.
•

*

•

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of
December, 1997, the deposition of GREGORY J. GARDNER
was taken before Shelly Van Tassell, Registered
Professional Reporter, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. at the
law offices of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, One Utah
Center, Suite 1300, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
*

•

•

Shelly Van Tassell
, Registered Professional Reporter

MERIT

5 DAY DELIVERY
(801) 322-3742
185 South State Street #920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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I U *

P I B I

A

I think so•

Q

And upon the termination of your relationship,

in other words Rehab's relationship with Sports

1

Medicine Center in May of 1989, did you and Toole

i

continue to provide services and therapy to the
various high schools that you had prior to the
agreement?
A

We did.

Q

So you took those with you when you left, when

you terminated with Sports Medicine Center; is that
right?
A

We took the schools with us, the same ones that

we had brought to the table.

I

Q

Right.

You considered them to be your

patients; is that right?
1

A

They were not our patients, but -•-

1

Q

Your customers?

A

Customers, sure.

Q

I thought it would be a kind way to put it to

call them patients.

Do you call them really

customers?
A

No.

We call them patients.

Q

And the patients that you had at the Sports

Medicine Center, upon Rehab's termination of its
agreement with the Center in May 19 89, did you take

39
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those patients with you?
A

I believe most of the patients remained with

us, yes.
Q

And where --

A

The patients that we were treating at the time

of termination, they completed their treatments with
us at other locations.
Q

At other locations.

A

Right.

Q

Which ones?

A

Either at Jordan Valley Hospital or at that

time Holy Cross Hospital.
Q

And that was under the name of the Physical

Therapy or Professional Services -- Professional
Therapy Clinic; is that right?
A

Right.

Q

Now, paragraph 11 of the termination and

purchase agreement with the Center provided that in
the event the Center was sold to a third party within
a period of two years from the date of the agreement
that one-third of the purchase price that was
attributed to good will would be sent over to Rehab.
Is that a fair characterization of the general
provisions of paragraph 11?
A

Yes.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q

Did you understand when you sighed paragraph 11

that in order for that paragraph to be operable that
the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was an
important aspect of any such sale to a third party?
A

Right.

Correct.

Q

And that in order for this paragraph 11 to be

triggered, it is true, is it not, that it was your
understanding that the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center had to be sold to the third party and used by
the third party after the sale?
A

That's correct.

Q

Now, can you point to any document or any

writing in which you are aware that the name Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center was sold by Sports Medicine
Center to IHC as part of the transaction that followed
in May of 1990?
A

No, I couldn't tell you that.

Q

You've seen the agreement, have you, or a copy

of the agreement?
A

I have.

Q

The purchase agreement?

A

I have, yes.

Q

And by the purchase agreement, I mean the asset

purchase agreement between the Center, Salt Lake Knee
& Sports Medicine and IHC hospitals.

41
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

I'll mark that as Exhibit 5.

3

(Whereupon Exhibit No. 5 was

4

marked for identification.)
MR. CAMPBELL:

5
6

of this, but if you need that.
(Off the record.)

7
8
9
10

John, I think you've got a copy

Q

And is Exhibit 5 the document, sir, that you

say you have seen or reviewed?
A

[

I've seen it.

i

11

Q

When did you first see it?

12

A

Well --

13

Q

Your best recollection.

14

A

I guess it was 1992 sometime.

15

Q

And what was the occasion in which you had to

16
17

see it?
A

I believe our attorneys requested this

18

information from either, I believe, IHC or from Paulos

19

and Rosenberg.

20

Q

Which attorneys?

21

A

John Green.

22

Q

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Good-looking fellow sitting across from me

25

You're talking about Mr. Green here.

sleeping.

,

I
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1

I

A

Yup.

2

I

Q

And have you reviewed various provisions of it

3

| over the ensuing months while this case has been

4

I pending?

5

A

I reviewed it -- it's been a long time.

6

Q

Now -- go ahead.

7

A

I haven't really recently read it, no.

8

Q

Looking at that agreement, is there any portion

9

of that agreement in which you can point to in which

10

IHC purchased the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine

11

Center as part of the assets which it acquired when it

12

purchased one-half of the Salt Lake Knee & Sports

13

Medicine?

14

go ahead.

Do you want to take some time?

15

A

Sure.

16

Q

Why don't we do this.

I want to keep you on

17

the record in answering this question.

18

to give you the time.

19

now.

20

whatever recess.

21
22
23

A

If you do,

I'll be happy

I don't want to recess right

Let's finish this question and then we will take

Okay.

What am I looking for again?

Ask me

that again.
Q

You told me just a moment ago that you didn't

24

know of any writing or any written document in which

25

IHC had purchased the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine
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Center.
A

Okay.

Q

I've now shown you the exact agreement that you

say you did see.

And I'm saying, is there anything

that you can point to in which there was a sale of the
name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center to IHC as a part
of the purchase agreement between IHC and Drs. Paulos
and Rosenberg?
A

I don't see the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine

Center.
Q

Was it your understanding, Mr. Gardner, that,

in fact, the name that was used by Sports Medicine
Center and IHC in connection with the purchase
represented by Exhibit 5 was called "Sports Medicine
West?"
A

That was the company that -- that was the

surviving company, as I understand it.
Q

And did you understand that after May 24, 1990,

that the Sports Medicine Center and IHC had entered
into a joint venture called Sports Medicine West?
A

All I knew was that there was a sale that

included the 39th South facility.
Q

But was it your understanding that after May

24, 1990, that Paulos and Rosenberg operated the
Sports Medicine Center under the name Sports Medicine

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC.,
fka PROFESSIONAL THERAPY
INC.,

CERTIFIED COPY

Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. 910906316CN

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE &
SPORTS MEDICINE, a Utah
general partnership,
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C.,
a Utah professional
corporation, general
partners,

Deposition of:
DOUGLAS B. TOOLE

Defendants.
*

*

•

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of
December, 1997, the deposition of DOUGLAS B. TOOLE
was taken before Shelly Van Tassell, Registered
Professional Reporter, at the hour of 11:20 a.m. at the
law offices of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, One Utah
Center, Suite 1300, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake
C£ty, Utah.
•

*

*

Shelly Van Tassell
Registered Professional Reporter

MERIT

5 DAY DELIVERY
(801) 322-3742
185 South State Street #920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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n
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I

Q

1

You've never disclosed on any of those as an

2

asset any good will or anything known as Salt Lake

3

City or Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center?
A

4

No, I haven't.

I didn't do it, because at that

time we hadn't received any benefit from it.

5

Q

6

You have no knowledge or information that the

7

name Salt Lake City Sports Medicine Center or Salt

8

Lake Sports Medicine Center was sold to IHC?
A

9

I don't know that the name was sold, no.

I

10

know that the company that we assumed we were running,

11

Salt Lake City Sports Medicine Center at 3900 South,

12

that entity was sold.

13

1

Q

How it was sold, I don't know.

Your entity that was named Salt Lake Knee &

14

Sports Rehab, the rehab entity, that was never sold to

15

IHC?

16

A

Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehab?

17

Q

Yes.

18

A

No.

19

Q

It was never sold to Paulos and Rosenberg?

20

A

No.

21

'

MR. ANDERSON:

Why don't we take a break here.

22

I'm7getting fairly close to finishing.

23

minutes to go over my notes, and I don't think we will

24

be any more than 15, 20, 30 minutes.

25

Give me five

(Recess.)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

* *

SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC.,
fka PROFESSIONAL THERAPY
INC.,

CERTIFIED COPY

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 910906316CN

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE &
SPORTS MEDICINE, a Utah
general partnership,
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C.,
a Utah professional
corporation, general
partners,

Deposition of:
DOUGLAS B. TOOLE

Defendants.
*

* *

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of
December, 1997, the deposition of DOUGLAS B. TOOLE
was taken before Shelly Van Tassell, Registered
Professional Reporter, at the hour of 11:20 a.m. at the
law offices of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, One Utah
Center, Suite 1300, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
*

* *

Shelly Van Tassell
Registered Professional Reporter
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5 DAY DELIVERY
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Professional Therapy Clinic, Inc.

1

A

2

I think that's how it went.

We've got those

records on file, I think.

3
4

When that merger occurred, do you know what

Q

5

happe ned to your stock in Salt Lake Knee & Sports

6

Rehab ?

7

A

It was exchanged for stock.

My understanding

8

was i t was exchanged for stock in Professional

9

Thera py.

10

It was all rolled into that company.

Do you know if you continued to own the stock

Q

11

individually or if Professional Therapy acquired the

12

stock ?
A

13

As far as I can remember, it became part of

Professional Therapy.

14
15

Q

Did you receive any consideration or

16

compensation for your stock in Rehab when it merged

17

with Professional Therapy?

18
19

1

A

No.

Q

At the time that Rehab was an active

20

corpo ration, did Professional Therapy operate any

21

other -businesses or at any other business locations?

22

A

23

Q

-- Yes.
Give me a background, if you would, on the

24

different operations you had and locations and let me

25

know how the corporations fit together.

24
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MERIT REPORTERS

A

Well, Professional Therapy Clinic, Inc. at that

time was a separate corporation.
1002 East South Temple.

It had a business at

And then we had a business at

3590 West 90th South in West Jordan.
Q

Any others?

A

Not at that time.

Q

When you say at that time, what is the time

frame you're referring to?
A

1985 to 1987.

Q

To take a step back, Professional Therapy was

incorporated in 1978 approximately, based on your
prior testimony.
A

Yes.

Q

From 1978 to 1985 where did Professional

Therapy operate its business?
A

1002 East South Temple.

Q

What was the nature of the business?

A

Physical therapy.

Q

And 1002 East South Temple, is that a medical

building?
A

The Moreau Medical Building.

Q

Is that associated with Holy Cross Hospital?

A

It was.

Q

At the time was it associated with Holy Cross

Hospital?

25
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1
2
3

A

Yes.

The bui lding was owned by Holy Cross

Hospi tal.
Q

Okay.

And wh ile Professional Therapy

4

maintained offices there, did Professional Therapy

5

have any contract or relationship with Holy Cross

6

Hospi tal?

7

A

It did, yes.

8

Q

What was the nature of that relationship?

9

A

Contract was to provide outpatient physical

10

therapy services for the hospital.

11

Q

Does that contract still remain today?

12

A

We still provide those services.

13
14

The contract

has b een negotiated, you know, several different
1 times , but we still provide those services.

15

Q

To Holy Cross Hospital or its successor?

16

A

Its successor •

17

Q

Who is that now?

18

A

Right now it is Paracelsus Health Care.

19

Q

Do you still operate, then, out of the Moreau

20
21
22
23

Medical Building?
No, we don't.

A

'Q

But you still provide the services to the

hospital?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

During the period, though, from 1978 through

26
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1987, Professional Therapy was operating offices in
the Moreau Medical Building providing outpatient
service to Holy Cross Hospital; is that right?
A

We were.

Somewhere around 1987, 1988 we moved

to a new location just half a block east.
Q

Where was that?

A

24 South 1100 East in what's called the MedPlex

Building.
Q

MedPlex?

A

MedPlex, uh-huh.

Q

Does Professional Therapy still have offices

there?
A

No.

Q

How long did it have offices there?

A

For approximately five years.

Q

To give us some time frame on that, to the best

of your recollection when did it cease maintaining its
offices there?
A

Oh, approximately 1993.

1993, approximately.

Q

Why did it stop maintaining offices there?

A

The hospital wanted the space that we were in

so they could bring more doctors into that medical
office building, and they offered us an opportunity to
move our facility into what is now Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center.

And so we chose to do that.

27
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'

Q

Where is the Salt Lake Regional Medical Center

locat ed?
A

1050 East South Temple.

The old Holy Cross

Hospi tal.
Q

So rather than being in the MedPlex Building,

you moved into the actual hospital itself.
A

Yes.

'

Q

Is Professional Therapy in the hospital now?

!

A

Yes.

Q

So it's at that same location?

A

It is.

Q

And continues to provide services,

rehab ilitation services, to hospital outpatients?
A

Uh-huh.

(Affirmative). We now provide

physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech and
audio logy.
Q

You indicated that from 1985 to 1987 you also

! operated office space at 3590 West 90th South in West
Jorda n; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q - - Was that business operated by Professional
Therapy, the corporation?
A

Yes.

Q

What was the nature of that business?

A

Physical therapy.

28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MERIT REPORTERS

Q

What happened in 1987 to that business

location?

'

A

It's still there.

Q

You' re still there?

A

Yes.

Q

And you still offer physical therapy there?

A

Yes.

Q

Any other services?

A

Occu pational therapy and speech therapy.

And

we offered audiology until November 1st of this year.
Q

Did you stop offering it at that time?

A

Yes.

Q

Why is that?

A

We c hose to let the two physicians that we did

most of the work for take that business.

They brought

it into the ir business.
Q

Did they purchase it from you?

A

They' are assuming the equipment lease.

Q

Was any consideration paid other than the

assumption of that lease hold obligation?
A

No.

Q

Where is that building?

Is that associated

with a hosp>ital or a medical center?
A

It's on the campus of Jordan Valley Hospital.

Q

Is that also owned by Paracelsus?
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j

1

'

A

No.

2

'

Q

Who owns that hospital?

A

Perry & Holmes, I believe, are the owners.

3
4

Southwest Medical Partnership is who owns it, if I

5

remember it right, and Perry & Holmes are the

6

managers.

7

Q

Are those individuals?

8

A

That's a company, I believe, as far as I know.

9

Q

When you began leasing space there, was it

10

! known as the Jordan Valley Hospital?

11

A

Jordan Valley Holy Cross.

12

Q

When you officed there was it owned by Holy

13

Cross?>

14

A

The hospital was, yes.

15

Q

Did you have a contract with Holy Cross with

1

16

1 respect to outpatient rehab in that particular

17

'

location?

18

A

We had in and outpatient rehab.

19

Q

At that location?

20

A

At that location it was outpatient.

21

is aa. outpatient clinic.

22

hospital itself.

23

Q

3590 West

We provided inpatient in the

At any time since 1978 has Professional Therapy

24

operated any other clinics or businesses or had any

25

other lease space?
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A

I'm trying to think.

We had a clinic in Park

City.
Q

Where was that?

A

It was at the Prospector Athletic Club.

Q

Is that in Prospector Square?

A

Yes.

Q

When did Professional Therapy take down that

It's right next to the Prospector Hotel.

space?
A

Take it down or leave it?

Q

When did you start operating your business

there?
A

Approximately February of '94.

Q

What is the nature of the business that's

operated there?
A

Well, it's not there now.

But it was physical

therapy.
Q

Okay.

So you started in 1994, February?

A

Yes.

Q

When did you cease doing business at that

location?
A

June of '97.

-Q------ Why did you cease doing business at that
location?
A

We couldn't find what we felt was an adequate

therapist to cover it and it was not making a profit,

31
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MERIT REPORTERS

1

so we closed it.

2

Thera py as a memb er as a 50 percent -- not 50 percent

3

now, but it's a p art ownership of Rehab Services of

4

Craig , Colorado,

And then we joined Professional

5

Q

Is that a corporation?

6

A

It's an 11 z,

7

Q

Okay,

8
9
10
11

Colorado lie.

Wha t is the portion of the ownership of

Professional Ther Eipy in that company?
It changed approximately three months ago, and

A

I've got to think .
Q

Let's back up.

Why don't you tell me when

12

Professional Therapy acquired an interest in Rehab

13

Services of Craig , Colorado.

14

I'm trying to think of the exact dates.

A

It was

15

appro ximately in -- that business started in 19 -- I

16

don't remember if it was '93 or '94.

17

those

18

Q

Let me ju st go back here.

It was one of

1994.

So Professional Therapy acquired an interest in

19

Rehab Services of Craig, Colorado in 1994 sometime, to

20

the best of your recollection.

21

A

Yes.

22

a

Prior to that time did you persona lly have any

23
24
25

involvement with Rehab Services of Craig, Colorado?
A

No-

that time.

That' s a new company that we formed at
It's a new partnership, lie, at that time.
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Q

When you say we formed the new lie, who are you

referring to?
A

Mountain Land Physical Therapy and Professional

Therapy.
Q '

Professional Therapy you've identified and

described already.

What is or who is Mountain Land

Physical Therapy?
A

Mountain Land Physical Therapy is a company in

Salt Lake City that provides rehab services.
Q

Do you have any ownership interest in Mountain

Land Physical Therapy?
A

No.

Q

Have you ever had an interest in that?

A

No.

Q

Does Mr. Gardner, to your knowledge?

A

No.

Q

Who owns Mountain Land Physical Therapy?

A

To my knowledge, it's Mark Anderson, Kent

Montgomery and Jim Liken.
Q

Are they physical therapists?

A

They have different corporations, and I don't

know if Jim Liken is an owner of Mountain Land
Physical Therapy or Mountain Land Rehab.
different corporations set in there.

They have

But Mr. Liken is

an occupational therapist.
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Q

And are the other two physical therapists?

A

Physical therapists.

Q

And so their corporate entity or entities and

your <corporate entity, Professional Therapy, each
acquired an interest in Rehab Services of Craig,
Colorado; is that fair to say?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

In fact, those two entities set up and created

(Affirmative).

Rehab Services of Craig, Colorado; is that accurate?
!

A

Q

Yes.
Do they each have a 50 percent ownership

interest in Rehab Services of Craig, Colorado?
A

Not at this time.

Like I said, we purchased a

company there, and now I think we have less than 50
percent ownership.
Q

At the time Rehab Services of Craig, Colorado

was set up as an lie though, did your entity,
Professional Therapy, and the Mountain Land Physical
Thera]?y entity each own half interest?
A

Yes.

Q - - And since that time the ownership interest has
changed.
A

When did that occur and why?

It occurred approximately August or September

of 1997.

An exact date I don't know right off.

I

would have to look at the records.
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Q

So just a few months ago.

A

Rehab Services of Craig purchased Function

Works, Colorado.
or corporation.

I don't know whether it was an lie
And an individual with Function Works

acquired in that transaction a percentage ownership of
Rehab Services of Craig.
Q

So since the acquisition of Function Works, has

Function Works held an equal interest in Rehab
Services of Craig, Colorado?
A

No.

We purchased Function Works.

We just

bought the assets of the company.
Q

Okay.

A

And then one of the owners of Function Works

became an owner of Rehab Services of Craig.
Q

What was his ownership interest?

A

Her ownership.

And I believe it's

approximately, don't hold me to this, but
approx imately 20 percent.
Q

And does Professional Therapy and Mountain Land

Physical Therapy, do they each reduce their ownership
interest correspondingly?
A

Yes.

Q

So, to the best of your knowledge, do they each

own a 40 percent interest and then this woman owns 20
percent?
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A

Approximately, yes.

Q

What is her name?

A

Her name is Val Perkins,

Q

Is she a resident of Craig, Colorado?

A

She is.

'

Q

What is her occupation?

A

Physical therapist.

Q

What is the nature of the business of Function

Works ?
A

Provided physical therapy and occupational

1 therapy services.
Q

Was that a physical therapy clinic that she

owned and operated?
A

Well, it was a company.

They had a clinic and

then they also provided home health services.
Q

Did she own the company?

A

She was part owner, yes.

Q

When the company was acquired, did Rehab

Services of Craig, Colorado begin to offer home health
services or was that aspect of the business
discontinued?
A

No.

We were in that business,r and we still are

in that business.
Q

When you say you were in that business, who are

you referring to?
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A

Rehab Services of Craig did do some home

health.
Q

Any other businesses that Professional Therapy

has been involved in since its inception in 1978?
A

Not Professional Therapy.

how they all fit together.

I'm trying to think

Not as Professional

Therapy Clinic, Inc., no.
Q

So Professional Therapy Clinic, Inc. has been

invc)lved at the locations you've described and the
businesses you've described and none others, to the
best. of your knowledge.
A

Not as Professional Therapy Clinic.

! Mr. Gardner and I have been involved in some other
businesses, but not Professional Therapy Clinic, Inc.
Q

Now, with respect to the other businesses that

! you and Mr. Gardner have been involved, if you'd
out!.ine those for me.
A

Well, we have an lie, D&G Therapy.

Q

D&G?

A

Uh-huh.

(Affirmative).

That's been an owner

of Western Therapy Associates.
Q

When did you and Mr. Gardner form D&G Therapy?

A

1994.

Q

And are you equal owners?

A

Yes.
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Q

Are there any other owners?

A

No,

Q

So you each own 50 percent of that company?

A

Yes.

Q

And that company, did it acquire Western

Therapy Associates?
A

It helped form Western Therapy Associates.

Q

Does D&G Therapy own Western Therapy

Associates?
A

Owns one-third of it.

Q

Is Western Therapy Associates a corporation?

A

I believe it's an lie.

Q

Who are the other owners?

A

Rocky Mountain Physical Therapy and Mountain

Land.
Q

Where does Western Therapy Associates operate

its business?
A

Its corporate offices are at the Mountain Land

offices in Salt Lake City.
Q

What's that?

A

I'd have to look it up.

I don't know exactly.

It's in Midvale.
Q

So the corporate offices are there?

A

Yes.

Q

Does it maintain a clinic somewhere?
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1

A

Western Therapy did until approximately the

2

first of October when it sold its assets to Rocky

3

Mountain Physical Therapy in Oregon.

4

Q

That was in October of this year?

5

A

Uh-huh.

'

(Affirmative).

Now, there's also a

6

Western Therapy Associates, Nevada that is again owned

7

in part 25 percent by Rocky Mountain, Mountain Land

8

and Professional Therapy.

9

percent is owned by two individuals that live in

10

Nevada

11

Q

12

And then the remaining 25

•

Okay.

Now, you said that 25 percent of Western

Therapy was owned by --

13

A

Western Therapy, Nevada.

14

Q

Yeah, thank you.

15

So 25 percent of that entity

! was owned by Professional Therapy*

16

A

No, by D&G Therapy.

17

Q

Okay.

The Rocky Mountain entity that owns 25

18

percent of Western Therapy, Nevada, is that the same

19

Rocky Mountain entity that acquired the assets of

20

Western Therapy Associates in Utah?

21
22
23
24
25

A

They acquired the assets of the two clinics in

Oregon that we were operating.
Q

Okay.

So Western Therapy Associates, did it

operate clinics in Oregon and Nevada or just Oregon?
A

It operated clinics in Oregon and Utah,
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Okay.

Q

And the assets of Weste rn Therapy were

subsequently sold to Rocky Mountain?
A

The clinic locations.

The assets atnd clinics

that were in Oregon -- Lakeview, Oregon and Burns,
Oregon -- were sold to Rocky Mountain .
What is the nature of the enti ty Rocky

Q

Mountain?
A

Is it a corporation?

I believe it is.

I don't know what. type

though .

1

'

Q

Does it operate in Oregon?

A

It's a Utah corporation.

Q

It's a Utah corporation?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

Who are the principals?

A

There's six or seven of them.

(Affirmative).

The principal we

deal mostly with is Paul Wartley.
Q

Is he a physical therapist?

A

He is.

And Jim Wartley is an owner.

And how

the rest of the ownership goes, I wou Id have to look
to get all of the names.
Q

Let me just see if I can summarize what my

undersitanding is of this entity and maybe ask some
questions.

As I understand it, then, D&G Therapy is

an lie that you and Mr. Gardner own, each of you own
50 percent of the entity.
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J

A

Uh-huh.

Q

And that entity in turn acquired a one-third

(Affirmative).

interest in Western Therapy Associates.

1

A

Yes.

Q

Which had clinics both in Utah and Oregon when

! it was acquired; is that fair to say?
A

No.

When it was first started the only clinics

were in Oregon.

1

Q

Okay.

So when D&G acquired its interest

initially, Western Therapy Associates just had clinics
in Or egon.

'

A

Yes.

Q

Subsequent to the acquisition of Western

Therapy by D&G and Rocky Mountain and -- what was the
other one, Mountain Land?
A

Uh-huh.

(Affirmative).

Q

Western Therapy set up some clinics in Utah as

well; is that right?
A

They set up a clinic in St. George.

Q

And that was a rehab clinic, physical therapy

clini c.

.

A

Physical therapy clinic.

Q

And then, as I understand it, Rocky Mountain

acqui red the assets of Western Therapy Associates.
A .

No.

It acquired the Oregon assets.

41
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MERIT REPORTERS

j

Okay.

Q

The Utah assets , in other words the

' St. George rehab facility and therapy facility,
cont inued to be owned by D&G, Rocky Mountain and
' Mountain Land each as a third owner; is that right?

'

'

A

Uh-huh.

Q

Is that true today?

A

It is.

Q

And it continues to op<srate its clinic in

(Affirmative) »

i

' St. George?
No, it doesn't.

A

It's jnot operating that

clinic.
Q

Does it operate any cl inics now?

A

Western Therapy Associates doesn't operate, per

se. but we have Western Therapy Associates in Nevada
that is still operating a clinic in Mesquite and
Overton.
Now, Western Therapy o f Nevada or Western

Q

Therapy Associates of Nevada, is that a separate legal
enti ty?
A

Yes.

Q

Is it an lie?

A

Yes.

Q

How is that owned?

A

25 percent Rocky Mountain, 25 percent Mountain

-

Land, 25 percent D&G Therapy, and 25 percent --
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I

Q

These two individuals.

A

These two individuals in Nevada.

Q

And that is an ongoing active entity and it has

clinics in the state of Nevada; is that right?
A

It does.

Q

Was that entity also formed in 1994?

A

No.

That was formed later.

I don't know the

exact date on that, but that was formed at a later
time.
Q

But it was formed by the four people that owned

the stock or are the owners of that company.
A

It was, yes.

Q

Do you and Mr. Gardner own any other businesses

or assets or have you been involved in any other
businesses?
A

Industrial Physical Therapy.

Q

What is the nature of that entity?

A

Sub S corporation.

Q

Utah corporation?

A

Yes.

•Q

What is the nature of its business?

A

Physical therapy and occupational therapy.

Q

Does it operate any clinics?

A

Yes.

Q

Where does it operate?
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A

It operates at 441 South Redwood Road

Q

Is that a medical office building or hospital?

A

It's an industrial medical office building.

Q

What is the ownership interest that you and

Mr. Gardner have in that entity?
A

50 percent.

Q

You each own 50 percent?

A

Yes,

Q

No other owners?

A

No.

Q

The nature of the business is similar to the

business that you operate under Professional Therapy?
A

Yes.

Q

Is there a reason why you incorporated that

separately?
Yes.

A

I started th e company with Jim Jukes,

1 another therapist at the time we started it.

Since

that time -- pardon?
Excuse me, I didn' t mean to interrupt you.

Q

When was it started?
A.

I think 1982.

Approximately 1982.

Q

And has it been op erated continuously since

that date?
A

It has.

Q

When did Mr. Jukes cease his involvement with
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the company?
A

I don't know the exact date.

But he sold his

25 percent interest to Mr. Gardner and then I sold 25
percent interest of my stock to Mr. Gardner.
Q

So prior to that time you owned 75 percent

interest?
A

Yes.

Q

What did you receive in consideration for

selling your stock, the 25 percent or half of your
stock rather?
A

Well, I only sold 25 percent of my stock.

Q

Well, you owned --

A

.75 percent.

And I sold 25 percent.

I still

own 50.
Q

Okay.

What did you receive for selling 25

percent of your stock?
A

Somewhere in the neighborhood of at that time

60- to $65,000.
Q

I don't know the exact amount.

And did Mr. Jukes receive the same amount for

his 25 percent ownership?
A

That I don't know.

Q

Did you sell it at the same time?

A

We did.

Q

When did that sale occur, approximately, to the

best of your recollection?
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A

1990, 1991, approximately.

I don't know that

for sure without looking at the documents.
Q

Okay.

Are there any other entities in which

you or Mr. Gardner have had an interest?
A<

Not that I can recall.

Q

So those that you've described on the record

here this afternoon, to the best of your knowledge
those are the entities in which.you've been involved
since you began your career as a physical therapist;
is that fair to say?
A

Yeah, it is.

Q

The Industrial Physical Therapy company that

you just described, you indicated what their address
is.

Has it operated at any other address?

A

It hasn't.

Q

So it's been there since its inception and it

continues to operate there?
A

Well, it provides services for Salt Lake

Industrial Clinic, and that clinic has changed
locations.
location.

We've always been at that clinic's
So it hasn't been at 441 South Redwood Road

during its entirety, but wherever Salt Lake Industrial
Clinic has been located it's been in that clinic.
Q

Have you also provided physical therapy

services for certain high schools in the greater Salt
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wjrir
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CONTRACT
and
LEASE AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT made this

J3^

day of

^pi^U

1987, between SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER, a Utah
Partnership/ comprised of Thomas D, Rosenberg M.D., a
Professional Corporation, Lonnie E, Paulos, M.D., Inc., a
Professional Corporation, and Russell A. Toronto M.D.,
(hereinafter referred to as "Medicine"), and SALT LAKE KNEE
and SPORTS REHABILITATION, INC., a Utah Corporation,
(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation".)
WHEREAS Medicine operates a sports medicine
center at 670 East 3900 South in Salt Lake City, Utah,
(hereinafter referred to as the "Center*;, and
WHEREAS Medicine desires to make available to its
patients professional physical ..therapy services at the
Center, and
WHEREAS Rehabilitation is organized for the
purpose of rendering physical therapy services by registered
professional pnysical therapists who are qualified and
registered under the laws of the State of Utah to prcvide
professional physical therapy services, and
WHEREAS Rehabilitation is desirous of providing
professional physical therapy services to Medicine's
patients and to otherwise provide pnysical therapy services

Z DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
/
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-2at and for the Center operated by Medicine upon the terms
and conditions contained in this Contract and Agreement.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
covenants, conditions, duties and responsibilities contained
herein, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS.

The parties

intend that an independent contractor-employer relationship
will be created by this Contract and Agreement.

No agent,

employer, or servant of Rehabilitation shall be or shall be
deemed to be the employee, agent, or servant of Medicine.
Medicine is interested only in the results obtained under
.this Contract and Agreement.

The manner and means of

conducting the work are under the sole control of
Rehabilitation.

None of the benefits provided by Medicine

to its employees, including, but not limited to health,
worker's compensation, and unemployment insurance and
pension plans, are available from Mecicir.e to the employees,
agents or servants of Rehabilitation.

Rehabilitation will

be solely and entirely responsible for its acts and for the
acts of its agents, employees, and servants during the
performance of this Contract and Agreement, and Medicine
shall be solely responsible for the acts and/or omissions of
its officers, partners, agents or employees.
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-32.

LEASED SPACE.

Medicine shall provide to

Rehabilitation office space within Medicine's Sports
Medicine Center at 670 East 3900 South in Salt Lake Cityf
Utah, which office space shall contain at least 2,000 square
feet.

Said space shall be built-out and ready for occupancy

in a manner suitable for use as a physical therapy treatment
center.

By signing this Contract and Agreement,

Rehabilitation acknowledges the space is sufficiently built
out and suitably ready for occupancy.
3.

RENT.

Rehabilitation shall pay rent to

Medicine for such office space an amount equal to One
Thousand One Hundred Sixty Seven and 00/100 Dollars
($1,167.00) per month, which rent shall be due and payable
in advance on the first day of each calendar month during
the term of this Contract and Agreement.
Provided however, that in the event that
Medicine's lease arrangement with IHC Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a
LDS Hospital is changed or modified in the future, or when
the underlying lease vith F.C. Stangl H I is renegotiated,
Rehabilitation shall be required to adjust the amount
payable as rent hereunder to equal one-half (1/2) of the
rental which Medicine is required to pay on the Center.
4.

UTILITIES AND JANITORIAL, AND MAINTENANCE.

Rehabilitation, in addition to the rent obligation described
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-4in paragraph 3 hereof, shall also pay one-half (1/2) of all
utility and janitorial costs of the Center, and of all other
maintenance costs which are related to or benefit the Center
as a whole.

Each party shall be responsible for payment of

all maintenance or repair costs related solely to its own
space.

Said share of utility, janitorial and maintenance

payments shall be reimbursed by Rehabilitation to Medicine
within fifteen (15) days after Rehabilitation is advised in
writing by Medicine of the amount due.
5.

SERVICES PROVIDED.

Rehabilitation shall

provide professional physical therapy and other physical
rehabilitation services to patients at the Center.

Said

services shall be provided in a timely manner and shall be
of a quality commensurate with"the highest standards of
physical therapy services provided by registered physical
therapists in the intermountain region of the United States.
6.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

Rehabilitation shall

provide at its discretion and expense, such personnel and
equipment as is necessary to provide the services referred
to in the preceding paragraph.

There shall be no sharing of -

personnel between Medicine and Rehabilitation unless agreed
to in writing in a separate document reflecting all terms of
such sharing.
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ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE.

Rehabilitation shall

bill and collect for all services it provides -o patients
for whom it has provided services and all such collections
shall be the sole and exclusive property of Rehabilitation.
All billings for services by either Rehabilitation or
Medicine shall be done separately.
8.

OUTSIDE REFERRALS.

Rehabilitation shall have

the right to accept patient referrals from other sources,
and to provide physical therapy and rehabilitation services
to its own patients at the Center.
9.

REPRESENTATIONS TO PU3LIC.

Neither party

shall make any representations to patients or the general
public which would reasonably lead patients or the general
public to believe that Rehabilitation or any of its
employees is an agent, employee cr servant cf or a partner
or joint venturer with the Partnership or the Center.
Rehabilitation shall separately identify with appropriate
signage and other necessary action, the office space which
it rents pursuant to Paragraph 2 abovef to indicate that it
is a separate business and operation frcm Center.

All

correspondence from Rehabilitation to its patients shall be
done on letterhead of Rehabilitation.
10.

SPECIAL PROJECTS.

Rehabilitation shall

prcvide such physical therapy support and personnel as are
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~6necessary to enable Medicine to effectively administer its
Agreement with Granite School District to provide a sports
medicine program for the District, and to enable Medicine to
effectively administer such other high school sports
medicine programs as it may become involved in.
Provided that Medicine hereby agrees tc bear
two-thirds (2/3) of all costs directly attributable to
supplying personnel and/cr equipment for the above described
special programs, lectures, training and demonstrations, and
Rehabilitation shall bear one-third (1/3) cf said costs.
Provided further that the parties shall decide in
advance the costs which will be deemed attributable to the
providing of services as set forth in this paragraph*
It is understood that the time cf physicians and
physical therapists which is spent in attending, supporting
and administering the special programs, lectures, training,
and demonstrations, shall be considered volunteer time and
there shall be no reimbursement for their time or sharing of
their salaries for such time pursuant tc the above cost
sharing provisions.
Subject to Medicine's overall control cf the
special high school sports medicine program, Rehabilitation
shall supervise all athletic trainers or physical therapists
while at any school and operating under the program*
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Rehabilitation shall at Medicine1 s request cooperate and
fully participate in publishing of a newsletter dealing with
sports medicine topics, which relates to the high schocl
program and which shall be distributed to high schools and
to patients of the parties hereto.
11.

INDEMNIFICATION.

Each party shall indemnify

the other and hold harmless their respective partners,
agents, employees, officers, directors and shareholders and
partners' shareholders against any claim, liability or loss
suffered as the result of services provided by a party, its
partners, officers, directors, employees or agents.
12.

TERM.

The term of this Contract and Agreement

shall run until September 30, 1988.

The Contract and

Agreement shall be automatically renewed for succeeding one
(1) year terms unless and until it is terminated in writing
by one of the parties as provided below.

Either party shall

be entitled to terminate this Contract and Agreement with or
without cause by giving the other party ninety (90) days
written notice.
13.

COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE.

Rehabilitation,

GREGORY J. GARDNER (hereinafter referred to as "Gardner")
and DOUGLAS B. TOOLE (hereinafter referred to as "Toole"),
shall be prohibited from rendering physical therapy services
within a five ;5) city block radius of the Center for a
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-8period of two years from the date of termination of this
Contract and Agreement, and shall not, for a period of two
(2) years from the date of termination, provide physical
therapy services to any patient that was originally a
referral from Medicine and was under treatment at the Center
at the time of termination.
With regard to the High School Sports Medicine
Programs described in. Paragraph 10 above, it is agreed by
the parties that at the termination of this Contract and
Agreement (whether by its terms or by either party for any
reason), Rehabilitation, Gardner and Toole shall be
prohibited from competing with Medicine in any sports
medicine program involving Granite School District or any of
its schools, and Medicine shall- be prohibited from competing
with Rehabilitation in any sports medicine program involving
any of the following high schools:

Judge Memorial, Jordan,

West Jordan, Davis, North Summit, ar.d South Summit.

Any

schools other than those set forth above, which become part
of Medicine's school program prior to the termination of
this Contract and Agreement, shall be divided evenly between
Medicine and Rehabilitation at the termination of the
Contract and Agreement.

The parties shall toss a coin with

the winner of the coin tcss having its first choice of
schools and the parties then alternating choices ur.til all
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-9the schools have been chosen*

Tn the event there is an

uneven number of schools involved, the final school shall be
assigned by a toss of the coin.

Once the schools have been

divided, the parties agree not to compete with the other in
sport9 medicine programs involving their respective schools.
The above-described covenant not to compete shall
be in effect for a period of two (2) years following the
termination of this /agreement.
If the covenant net to compete is enforced, it
must be enforced against all named individuals or will be
null and void as against all individuals.
It is hereby expressly agreed by the parties that
this non-competition clause is a material part of this
Agreement, and but for this restrictive covenant, the
parties would not be willing to enter into this Agreement.
14.

POSSIBLE SALE OF CENTER.

The parties

acknowledge that the combination of the two services within
one facility is and will be a dynamic method to provide
necessary services to patients of both Medicine and
Rehabilitation.
The parties further acknowledge that the trend in
the industry is to have centers such as the one established
by Medicine and Rehabilitation be purchased by full service
hospitals.
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-10In the event that an offer to purchase the Center
is received from any third party, Medicine hereby agrees not
to sell the Center unless the purchaser also agrees to
purchase the operation being conducted by Rehabilitation at
the Center including its leasehold interest as expressed
herein, together with goodwill, etc.

Provided that

Rehabilitation shall be solely responsible for the terms
including price for the purchase of its own assets such as
accounts receivable and equipment.

Rehabilitation agrees to

bargain in good faith in setting the purchase price and
terms on any such purchase.
The parties agree that any combined amount paid
for the goodwill of the respective parties shall be
aggregated and divided between the parties, with Medicine
receiving two-thirds of the total amount and Rehabilitation
one-third.
15.

BINDING AGREEMENT.

This Contract and

Agreement shall be binding on and inure to the benefit of
the parties, and their heirs, representatives, successors,
and assigns, and supercedes all other agreements relating to
the Center previously entered into between the parties.
16.

ATTORNEYS FEES.

Should any party default in

or breach ar.y of the covenants or agreements contained
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay all
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*

costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees,
which may accrue from enforcing this Contract and Agreement,
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder, or by
applicable law.
17.

SITUS,

This Contract and Agreement shall be

governed by and construed in accordance with laws of the
State of Utah.
18.

Time is of the essence of this Agreement.
INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE.

The provisions of

this Contract and Agreement shall be deemed and construed to
be independent and severable, and the invalidity or
unenforceability of any one provision or portion thereof
shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other
provision thereof.
19.

ASSIGNMENT.

Neither party to this Agreement

shall be entitled to assign this Agreement in whole or in
part without first obtaining the written consent of the
non-assigning party.

Any attempted assignment without

consent shall be null and void.
20.

TIME.

Time is of the essence of this

Agreement.
21.

INSURANCE.

Each party shall be responsible
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-12for providing at its own expense, public liability and
property damage insurance covering its operation at the
Center.
SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE
CENTER, a Utah Partnership
By THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D.,
a Professional Corporation

By LONNIE Jy PAUIOS/M.D., Inc.,
a Profe/s^fonM Corporation

RUSSELL A. TORONTO, M.D.'
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC.

By

^}±^^^t^dL^
Its/psswident

STATE OF UTAH

)
(S3 •

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On this (fa

day of

f)t/d/2£>l

19*5*7,

personally appeared before me LONNIE E. PAULOS, as president
of Lonnie E. Paulos, M,D-, Ire. a professional corporation,
THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, as president of Thomas D. Rosenberg,
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-13Inc, a professional corporation, and RUSSELL A. TORONTO,
M.D., General Partners of SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER,
a Utah partnership, who acknowledged to me that said
Professional Services Contract and Agreement was signed in
behalf of said partnership.

7
NOTARY P,#BJJC
Residing at: ^WA

6, U&LK

My Commission Expires:

?.&pJ 1990

JU

STATE OF UTAH
(ss<

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On this £ 3 ^ day of
personally appeared before me

<

z>*ir)l*^\^

H^tors

19 F 7 ,
CT^ (^IMPJLA^^

t

who being by rr.e duly sworn, did say that he is the president
of Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., a
professional corporation and acknowledged that the above
Professional Services Contract and Agreement was signed in
behalf of said corporation with authority first had and
obtained.

m

*\

'

/ V NOTARY V ^

NOTAR* BOBLIC

Residing a t \ s 4 * c f & 6 ~ & C

ExpjLres:
" '• " On. 3C,1577

«* f r , S« v

y

-*

an.
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-14ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OP APPLICATION
TO INDIVIDUAL THERAPISTS
IN CONSIDERATION of tue benefit to be derived by
each of us personally from the execution of the above
Professional Services Contract and Lease Agreement, and
because said Contract and Agreement would not be executed by
Physicians without this personal Acknowledgment by each of
us, we the undersigned GREGORY J. GARDNER and DOUGLAS B.
TOOLE, hereby agree to each be bound personally and as
representatives of Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation,
Inc. by the provisions of the above Contract and Agreement,
including specifically, but not limited to, the provisions
of Paragraph 13 relating to non-competition.
DATED this

2*2** day cf

^^pU^l«,^

/XJS>(Ju*~x^
GREGORY ^.C GARDNER
r\
DOUGLAS B. TOOLE
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-15ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF APPLICATION
TO INDIVIDUAL PHYSICIANS
IN CONSIDERATION of the benefit to be derived by
each of us personally from the execution of the above
Professional Services Contract and Lease Agreement, and
because said Contract and Agreement would not be executed by
Therapists without this personal Acknowledgment by each of
us, we the undersigned THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, H.D.

and LCNNIE

E. PAULOS, M.D., hereby agree to each be bound personally
and as representatives of our respective professional
corporations by the provisions of whe above Contract and
Agreement, including specifically, but not limited to, the
provisions of Paragraph 13 relating to non-competition.
DATED this l/^

day of

fJVwh/yl
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Attachment D
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szy u
TERMINATION AGREEMENT
AND
PURCHASE AGREEMENT

Agreement dated t h i s

^ / ^ d a y of

1989, between S a l t Lake Knee and Sports R e h a b i l i t a t i o n ,

Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation' 1 ), and S a l t Lake
City Knee & Sports Medicine (hereinafter referred to as
"Physicians").
WHEREAS Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
(hereinafter referred to as "Medicine") and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n
entered i n t o a Professional Services Contract and Lease
Agreement dated September 23, 1987 (hereinafter referred to
as the

H

Agreement"); and
WHEREAS Medicine gave to R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a Notice

of Termination dated January 19, 198 9 pursuant t o the terms
of the Agreement; and
WHEREAS Physicians i s the successor in i n t e r e s t to
Medicine; and
WHEREAS Rehabilitation d e s i r e s to s e l l

to

Physicians and Physicians desire to purchase from
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n certain equipment owned by R e h a b i l i t a t i o n and
c u r r e n t l y l o c a t e d at the o f f i c e of R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a t 670
East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah;
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual
covenants s e t forth below, the p a r t i e s hereto agree as
follows:
-! DEPOSITION
|
EXHIBIT
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u

-21.

Termination.

The Agreement is hereby

terminated effective April 19, 1989, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 13 of that Agreement, which by its
terms survives the termination of the Agreement,
2.

Vacation of Premises.

Rehabilitation shall

vacate the premises at 670 East 3 900 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises")
which is the subject of the Agreement, no later than Sunday,
April 23, 1989 at 12:00 Midnight.
3.

Release of Claims.

The parties hereto hereby

release each other and their predecessors' in interest and
principals for all claims and liability to each other
arising out of the Agreement or the parties1 performance
thereunder, except for any claims arising out of paragraph
11 and paragraph 13 of the Agreement, which claims are
specifically reserved by the parties.
4*

Sale of Equipment.

Rehabilitation hereby

sells to Physicians and Physicians hereby purchase from
Rehabilitation that equipment owned by Rehabilitation and
currently located at the "Leased Premises" which is set
forth in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein
by reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Equipment").
5.

Purchase Price.

The purchase price for the

Equipment shall be Thirty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred and
Twenty-Nine Dollars ($33,929.00) and shall be paid to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3Rehabilitation by Physicians in cash at the time of Closing,
subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 below.
6.

Payment of Costs in Connection with Granite

School District High School Sports Medicine Program.

In

addition to the purchase price for the Equipment, Physicians
shall pay to Rehabilitation at Closing, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 7 below, the sum of Six Thousand
Dollars ($6,000.00), which represents reimbursement to
Rehabilitation for costs incurred by Rehabilitation in
connection with Rehabilitation's participation in Medicine's
Granite School District High School Sports Medicine Program.
7._ Liens and Encumbrances,

It is understood by

the parties that the Equipment is encumbered by a security
interest held by West One Bank (as successor in interest of
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company) to secure payment of a
current balance owing of Forty-One Thousand Three Hundred
Eighty-One and 37/100 dollars ($41,381.37).

In addition, it

is understood that the Equipment, as well as certain
equipment previously sold by Rehabilitation to Physicians
(in approximately September of 1987) is encumbered by a
security interest held by Capital City Bank (as successor in
interest of Union Bank)*

Rehabilitation shall insure that

those encumbrances are cleared and released in connection
with the purchase hereunder.

In that regard, it is

understood that at Closing the payments to be made to
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-4Rehabilitation shall be paid jointly to Rehabilitation and
West One Bank.

Rehabilitation shall then use those funds

together with such of its own funds as necessary to
immediately pay off the amount owing to West One Bank and
procure and have filed a termination of West Onefs security
interest against the Equipment.

It is anticipated that the

parties will together proceed directly from the Leased
Premises to the West One Bank on the day of Closing to make
certain that the above-described procedure is accomplished.
8.

Closing, Closing shall occur at the Leased

Premises at a time mutually agreeable to the partiesf but in
no event later than Friday, May 5, 1989 at 5:00 p.m.

At

closing, Physicians or their representative shall take a
physical inventory of the Equipment.

At closing,

Rehabilitation shall provide to Physicians written
verification from Capital City Bank (as successor in
interest to Union Bank) that any liens or security interests
that entity may have against the Equipment and against any.
equipment Physicians or its partners may have previously
purchased from Rehabilitation (including without limitation
the physical therapy equipment located at 3 59 8th Avenue
which was purchased in approximately September of 198 7) have
been terminated.

Upon verification of the presence of each

item of Equipment, and upon receipt of the verification
required above, Physicians shall deliver to Rehabilitation a
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-5check made payable to Rehabilitation and West One Bank for
the entire purchase price of the Equipment together with the
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above.
9. Warranties.

Rehabilitation warrants that it

owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances
except those referred to in paragraph 7 above, and has the
right to sell the same. Rehabilitation further warrants
that all of the Equipment shall at the time of Closing be in
good working condition and free from defects.
10.

Coin Toss Regarding Murray High School.

Physicians and Rehabilitation acknowledges that pursuant to
paragraph 13 of the Agreement, the right to be involved in a
Sports Medicine program at high schools which became a part
of Medicine's High School Sports Medicine Program after the
effective date of the Agreement would be determined by a
toss of the coin.

The parties agree that Murray High School

fits into that category, and the parties therefore agree
that at Closing a coin toss shall be conducted between
Physicians and Rehabilitation, with the winner of that coin
toss having the sole right to conduct a Sports Medicine
Program at Murray High School, free from competition from
the loser of that coin toss.
11.

Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if

within two (2) years from the date of this Agreement,
Physicians sells the Center to any third party,
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-6R e h a b i l i t a t i o n s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to one-third (1/3) of

that

portion of the purchase p r i c e which is attributed t o good
will.

"Sale" s h a l l be defined as a transfer wherein the

purchaser acquires and pays consideration for a l l of

the

The Center ! s l e a s e on the Leased Premises,

following:

ownership of the name "Sale Lake Sports Medicine C e n t e r , n
a l l of the equipment and other a s s e t s located a t the Center,
t h e Center's p a t i e n t s and accounts r e c e i v a b l e , and whereby
t h e purchaser assumes complete operational control of the
business of the Center and continues operating under t h e
same name at the same l o c a t i o n .
12.

Binding Agreement.

This Agreement s h a l l be

binding on and inure to the benefit of the p a r t i e s , and
t h e i r h e i r s , s u c c e s s o r s , and a s s i g n s .
13.

Time.

Time i s of the essence of

this

Agreement.
**•

Attorneys F e e s .

Should any party d e f a u l t

or breach any of the covenants or agreements c o n t a i n e d
h e r e i n , t h e defaulting or breaching party s h a l l pay a l l
c o s t s and expenses, including reasonable attorneys f e e s ,
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in

-7which may accrue from e n f o r c i n g t h i s Agreement, or

in

p u r s u i n g any remedy p r o v i d e d hereunder, or by a p p l i c a b l e
law.
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC.

^
BY * h^ijju^
Its

8. \Ji>^C~

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah P a r t n e r s h i p
By LONNIE E. PAULOS^ M.D. , I n c .
a Professional^C^TPbra^ion,
General Pai

..By TBJOMAS.D. BOSENBERG, M.D., p.C.
a Professional Corporation,
'General Partner

By ' /j^C^

/j£*~

Thdinas D. Rosenberg
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Exhibit "A*

PKYSICAT. THERAPY EQUIPMENT •
3900 SOUTH CLIHIC
EQUIPMENT AT 70*
LEG CURL
SMITH MACHINE (SQUAT)
CROSSOVER (PULLEY SYSTEM)
COMPUTEROW
LEG PRESS
"OTAL BX7
METTLER ULTRASOUND
MULTIPLEX STIMULATOR
SCOTSMAN ZCZ MACHINE
PITRON CYCLE
MEDMSTRIC XT-1000
EXAM TABLES (6 f $350 ZA.)
CHATTANOGA XNTELECT STIM
HYBROCOLLATCR HOT PACK
WHIRLPOOL
MIXING VALVZ
CAST CUTTERS

PURCHASE
PRICE
1,217.00
1,145.00
1,392.00
I.2S9.QO
1,550.CO
1,411.00
907.00
1,677.00
1,092.00
907.00
2.038.00
1.050.00
1,330.00
630.00
605.00
263.00
161.00

TOTAL:

18,874.00

EQUIPMENT t 3 0 *
• LEG EXTENSION
SEATED CHEST PRESS
PULLOVER
AB CRUNCH
X I * COM
SANI GRINDER
SANDDCNS
TOTAL:

521.00
794.00
894.00
405.00
8.646.00
101.00
105.00
11,466.00

OPTICS EQUIPMENT 9 7 0 *
ISOTSC PHONES (4 g 270J
ISM WHSSLHRITER
AMANO TIMS CLOCK
TYPEWRITER 3TAN3
FILE CABINETS {2 * 480 J
POOT STOOL

756.00
490.00
210.00
32.00
672.00
25.00
229.00
56.00
28.00
70.00
462.00
559.00

WAITING ROOM SOFA (1/2)
LUNCHROOM TABLE
LUNCHROOM CHAIRS - 4
MICROWAVE
CHAIRS (3 S 134)
DESK
3,539.00
TOTAL:
Digitized by theCOSTS:
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law 6.000.00
School, BYU.
ATHLETIC TRAINING
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ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT, made as
of May 24, 1990, by and between SALT
LAKE

CITY

KNEE

AND

SPORTS

MEDICINE, a Utah general partnership
("Seller"); and IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a
Utah non-profit corporation ("Buyer").
RECITALS:
A.

Seller is engaged, and has owned assets utilized, in the business of

operating certain physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities that are presently
located at 670 East 3900 South, and 359 8th Avenue, in Salt Lake City, Utah,
(collectively, the "Rehab Facilities"), and a part time medical clinic located at the
Park City Resort Center in Park City, Utah (the "Park City Facilities").
B.

Seller desires to sell, transfer, and assign, and Buyer desires to

purchase, a undivided one-half interest in certain of the assets used in the Rehab
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, in connection with and as contemplated by
that certain Joint Venture Agreement of Sports Medicine West of even date
herewith between Seller and Buyer (the "Joint Venture Agreement"), upon the
terms and conditions set forth herein.
AGREEMENT:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:

/
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1.

Purchase and Sale. Seller hereby sells, transfers, and assigns to Buyer,

and Buyer hereby purchases from Seller, an undivided one-half interest in the
following described property (collectively, the "Assets"):
(a)

Personal Property and Accounts, Seller's right, title and interest

in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances, inventory, uniforms,
promotional materials, printed matters, supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses,
prepaid taxes, prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand, bank
deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and products thereof, records
pertaining to accounts receivable, causes of action, licenses, miscellaneous
personal property, goodwill and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, including, without limitation, the property
and items described on Exhibit ,1fA" attached hereto (collectively, the "Personal
Property and Accounts").
(b)

Leasehold Interests. Seller's right, title and interest (i) as a lessee

or tenant under that certain Lease Agreement pertaining to the Park City
Facilities, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" (the
"Park City Lease"), and (ii) in and to the space leases pertaining to the Rehab
Facilities (true and correct copies of the leases which include the Rehab Facilities
are attached hereto as Exhibit "C"), which shall be evidenced by subleases as
described in paragraph 5(i) hereof (collectively, the "Rehab Leases").
(c)

Material Contracts.

Seller's rights and obligations under those

certain contracts with respect to the Rehab Facilities and Park City Facilities, as
described on Exhibit "D" attached hereto (collectively, the "Material Contracts").

-2-
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2.

Purchase Price.

The purchase price for the purchase by Buyer

from Seller of an undivided one-half interest in the Assets shall be Six Hundred
Sixty Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars ($662,225), which shall be
paid by Buyer to Seller by bank certified or cashiers check or wire transfer upon
the execution of this Agreement by Seller and Buyer, and upon the execution by
the appropriate party of all other documents and instruments contemplated hereby
(this Agreement and said documents and instruments are hereinafter sometimes
referred to collectively as the "Purchase and Sale Documents11).
3.

Representations and Warranties of, Seller.

Seller represents and

warrants to Buyer the following matters as of the date hereof, with the
understanding that Buyer is relying upon said representations and warranties in
entering into the Purchase and Sale Documents:
(a)

Organization of Seller.

Seller is a general partnership duly

organized, validly existing and in good standing under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of Utah, and carries on the businesses of, among other things, operating
the Rehab Facilities and the Park City Facilities.

Seller has the power and

necessary licenses to own all of its properties and assets and to carry on its
businesses as presently conducted, and is duly authorized to sell to Buyer an
undivided one-half interest in the Assets pursuant to the Purchase and Sale
Documents.

The partners of Seller have taken all action required by Seller's

partnership agreement or otherwise to authorize the execution and delivery of the
Purchase and Sale Documents. The Purchase and Sale Documents are valid and
binding upon Seller in accordance with their terms.

-3-
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(b)

Litigation.

There are no suits, governmental proceedings, or

litigation pending, or to the knowledge of Seller, threatened which might
materially affect the financial condition, business or property of the Rehab
Facilities or Park City Facilities.
(c)

Personal Property and Accounts.

The list of Personal Property

and Accounts attached hereto as Exhibit "A" includes all inventory and equipment
with respect to the Rehab Facilities and Park City Facilities. Said inventory is
usable in the ordinary course of business and said equipment is in good condition
and repair, reasonable wear and tear excepted. All accounts receivable shown on
the list of Personal Property and Accounts attached hereto as Exhibit !fA,f arose in
the ordinary course of business, and subject to reasonable allowances for bad
debts, are collectible in the ordinary course of business.
(d)

Employment Contracts.

Except as set forth on Exhibit "Eft

attached hereto, there are no written contracts of employment between Seller and
any employee pertaining to the Rehab Facilities or Park City Facilities.
(e)

Title.

Seller owns the Assets free and clear of all liens,

encumbrances, interests, demands and claims of any kind, except for any
equipment leases, conditional sale contracts, or security interests which are
included in the Material Contracts, and subject to the terms of the Park City
Lease and Rehab Leases.
(f)

Material Contracts* True and correct copies of the Material

Contracts have previously been delivered to Buyer, and are in full force and effect
and are freely assignable without consent. All amounts due thereunder, through

-4-
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the date hereof, have been paid in full and Seller is not otherwise in default
thereunder.
(g)

Compliance With Law.

Seller has complied with and is not in

violation of any federal, state or local statute, law or regulation, including,
without limitation, any applicable building, zoning or other law, ordinance or
regulation affecting the operation of the Rehab Facilities or the Park City
Facilities, and holds or has obtained all governmental permits, licenses, consents,
approvals and waivers necessary for the lawful operation of the Rehab Facilities
and the Park City Facilities as now conducted.
(h)

No Material Adverse Change. There has been no material adverse

change in the financial condition of the operatioRs^ot the Rehab Facilities and
Park City Facilities from the M&joh 31, 1#9Q balance sheets and operating
statements with respect thereto and which have previously been delivered to
Buyer. As of the date hereof, the positive net worth of the Rehab Facilities and
Park City Facilities shall not be less than $167,756.

To the best of Seller's

knowledge, all financial statements provided by Seller to Buyer are true, correct
and complete and fairly present the financial position of the Rehab Facilities and
Park City Facilities.
(i)

Environmental Laws. Seller is not generating on the site of the

Rehab Facilities or Park City Facilities, and is not disposing of, any hazardous
substances or toxic wastes in violation of any applicable state or federal law
pertaining to such wastes.

-5-
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(])

Liabilities.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "Fff is a list of the

liabilities pertaining to the Rehab Facilities and Park City Facilities as of April
30, 1990, all of which arose in the ordinary course of business.
(k)

Accuracy of Representations and Warranties. No representation

or warranty by Seller in the Purchase and Sale Documents, nor any statement,
certificate, list, document or schedule furnished or to be furnished by Seller
pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Documents or in connection with the
transactions contemplated hereby, contains or shall contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omits or shall omit a material fact necessary to make the
statements contained therein, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.
4.

Representations and Warranties of Buyer.

Buyer represents and

warrants to Seller the following matter's as of the date hereof, with the
understanding that Seller is relying upon said representations and warranties and
entering into the Purchase and Sale Documents:
(a)

Organization of Buyer.

Buyer is a non-profit corporation duly

organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of
Utah, has corporate power to own all of its properties and assets and to carry on
its businesses as presently conducted, and has corporate power and is duly
authorized to enter into the Purchase and Sale Documents.

The Board of

Directors of Buyer has taken all action required by law, its articles of
incorporation, bylaws or otherwise to authorize the execution and delivery of the
Purchase and Sale Documents, and the Purchase and Sale Documents are valid and
binding upon Buyer in accordance with their terms.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(b)

Accuracy of Representations and Warranties* No representation

or warranty by Buyer in the Purchase and Sale Documents, nor in any statement,
certificate or schedule furnished or to be furnished by Buyer pursuant to the
Purchase

and Sale

Documents,

or in connection with the

transactions

contemplated hereby, contains or shall contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omits or shall omit a material fact necessary to make the statements
contained therein, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, not
misleading.
5.

Closing Transactions*

Simultaneously with the execution of this

Agreement, the parties hereto shall execute and deliver to the other, as
appropriate, the following:
(i)

Seller and Sports Medicine West shall enter into an

Assignment and Assumption Agreement with respect to the Park City
Lease and the Sublease for the Rehab Leases the forms of Exhibit ,fG"
and f,H,f attached hereto, respectively.
(ii)

Seller shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Special

Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment with respect to the Personal
Property and Accounts, in the form of Exhibit "I" attached hereto.
(iii)

Seller and Buyer shall enter into the Assignment and

Assumption of Material Contracts in the form of Exhibit "J" attached
hereto.
(iv)

Seller and Buyer shall enter into a Blanket Assignment and

Assumption in the form of Exhibit ffKtf attached hereto.

-7-
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(v)

Seller and Buyer shall have entered into the Joint Venture

Agreement and Seller and Buyer shall contribute their respective
undivided one-half interest in the Assets to Sports Medicine West as
provided in the Joint Venture Agreement, and shall execute such
documents as are necessary to evidence said contribution.
(vi)

Seller and Buyer shall deliver to each other evidence

reasonably acceptable to the other party authorizing the consummation
by the other party of the transactions contemplated hereby, and the
execution and delivery of the Purchase and Sale Documents.
6.

"As Is" Purchase.

Except for the representations and warranties of

Seller set forth herein, Buyer accepts and purchases, on a "where is, as is" basis,
an undivided one-half interest in the Assets.
7.

Indemnification. Seller shall indemnify Buyer and Sports Medicine West

and hold Buyer and Sports Medicine West harmless from and against all losses,
claims, damages or liabilities (including reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys1
fees) arising out of any breach of warranty or inaccurate or erroneous
representation of Seller contained herein, or arising from any liability of the
Rehab Facilities or Park City Facilities not assigned to and assumed by Buyer
hereunder, and which arose or was incurred prior to the date hereof. Buyer shall
indemnify Seller and Sports Medicine West and hold Seller and Sports Medicine
West harmless from and against all losses, claims, damages or liabilities (including
reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys1 fees) arising out of any breach of
warranty or inaccurate or erroneous representation of Buyer contained herein.

-8-
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8.

Default.

In the event of a default by any party hereto of their

respective obligations hereunder, the party not in default shall have all rights and
remedies available at law or in equity against the party in default, including,
without limitation, suing for specific performance and/or damages hereunder.
9.

Miscellaneous.
(a)

Commissions. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller that it has

not, and Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that it has not, employed any
broker, finder or consultant in connection with the transactions contemplated by
the Purchase and Sale Documents. Seller and Buyer represent and warrant to each
other that all negotiations relative to this Agreement have been carried on
directly between them without the intervention of any party. Except as otherwise
agreed to between the parties, Seller and Buyer will be responsible for the
payment of the charges of their respective counsel and for any other expenses in
connection with the Purchase and Sale Documents.
(b)

Notices.

Any notices or other communications required or

permitted hereunder shall be sufficiently given if hand-delivered or sent by
certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, or by telecopier,
addressed as follows:
To Seller:

Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine
359 East 8th Avenue, Suite 206
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attention:
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D.
Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D.
Gene Oakes

-9-
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Copy To:

Cary D. Jones, Esq.
HANSEN JONES <5c LETA
50 West Broadway
Suite 600 - Valley Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

To Buyer:

IHC Hospitals, Inc.
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street, Suite 2100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attention:
Everett N. Goodwin, Jr.

Copy To:

Thomas A. Ellison, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL <5c McCARTHY
50 South Main #1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

or to such other address as shall be furnished in writing by any party, and any such
notice or communication shall be deemed to have been given as of the date so
delivered or mailed.
(c)

Successors and Assigns. The Purchase and Sale Documents shall

be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective
heirs, successors and assigns.
(d)

Governing Law; Counterparts. The Purchase and Sale Documents

shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of
Utah, and may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be
deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.
(e)

Entire Agreement. The Purchase and Sale Documents contain the

entire agreement between the parties with respect to the

transactions

contemplated hereby and supersede all previous written or oral negotiations,

-10-
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commitments and writings and cannot be altered or otherwise amended except
pursuant to an instrument in writing signed by each of the parties hereto.
(f)

Headings.

The headings in the sections of this Agreement are

inserted for convenience only and shall not constitute a part hereof.
(g)

Further Assurances.

Each party shall, promptly upon the request

of the other, execute, acknowledge and deliver to the other, any and all further
instruments and assurances reasonably requested or appropriate to evidence or
give effect to the provisions of the Purchase and Sale Documents.
(h)

Litigation.

In the event of any litigation by any party hereto to

enforce the terms of the Purchase and Sale Documents, the prevailing party in
such litigation shall be entitled to receive from the other party payment of
attorneys' fees

incurred (whether

before

or after

commencement of such

litigation) by the prevailing party.
(i)

Exhibits.

All exhibits attached to this Agreement are hereby

incorporated in this Agreement by this reference.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by each of the
parties hereto as of the day and year first above written.
SELLER:
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE AND SPORTS MEDICINE
a Utah general partnership
By LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., INC.
a Utah professional c^poration
Its General Partner
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AND
By THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D.,
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
a Utah professional corporation
Its General Partner

(yCcix^j*
By. 7)
Thomas D. Rosenberg, President
BUYER:
IHC HOSPITALS, INC.
a Utah non-profit corporation
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EXHIBIT LIST
Exhibit "A"

List of Personal Property

Exhibit "B"

Park City Lease

Exhibit "C"

Rehab Lease

Exhibit ffD,f

List of Material Contracts

Exhibit TfEtf

List of Employment Contracts

Exhibit "F"

List of Liabilities

Exhibit lfGff

Assignment and Assumption of
Park City Lease

Exhibit "H"

Rehab Sublease

Exhibit "I"

Special Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment

Exhibit ,fJtf

Assignment and Assumption of Material Contracts

Exhibit ,fK!f

Blanket Assignment and Assumption
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SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE
Assets Listing
May 15, 1990
REHAB: - 8th Avenue:
Reception:
2 12-Button Phones
2 Wyse Terminals
1 Fujitsu DL-2400 Printer
1 4-Drawer Lateral File
1 IBM Selectric III Typewriter
2 Rolling Office Arm Chairs
1 Adding Machine
4 Mauve and Oak Waiting Room Chairs
1 Gray Cube End Table
1 Oak-Covered, Double-Pedestal Office Desk
1 Bostitch Pencil Sharpener
2 Plastic Chair Mats
2 Chart Cabinets
1 Dictaphone
Treatment Area:
1 Tredex Universal Treadmill
2 Exercise Bikes (Fitron Cybex)
2 Jumper Trampoline
1 Nautilus Super Pullover
1 Scotsman Ice Machine
1 Whitehall Hydrotherapy Equipment
1 Nordic Track
1 Universal Computerow
1 Westinghouse Freezer
6 Exam Tables
1 Cybex UBE Ergometer
2 Medtronic EGS and Stim
1 Ultra Sound Intellect 23OP
1 Lifecycle
1 Stairmaster
1 Pro Fitter
1 Wall Weight (NK Company)
1 Cybex Bike
1 Plyometric Board
1 Merac Computerized Testing Station
1 Video Player
1 Auto Range
Barbell Weights
1 Stainless Steel Cart

EXHIBIT A
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Cast Room:
1
2
1
2
1

Hydrocollatar
Exam Tables
Stryker Cast Cutter
Gray Wall Partitions
Cast Cabinet
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SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE
Assets Listing
May 1, 1990
REHAB: - 8th Avenue:
Rehab Office:
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

Double-Pedestal Oak Desks
Rolling Oak Burgundy Arm Chairs
4-Drawer Vertical Gray Cabinet
20-Button Phone
Realistic Stereo Tuner
McGohan 10-watt Amplifier Model MS-103
Sharp Stereo Cassette Deck RT-100
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SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE
Assets Listing
May 1, 1990
REHAB:

- 39th South

Office Area:
4
Isotec Phones^ /
1
IBM Wheelwriter^
1
Typewriter Stand^
2
F i l e Cabinets ^
1
Foot Stool^
y
1/2 Waiting Room S o f a ^
1
Lunchroom Tabled /
3
Lunchroom Chairs^
1
Microwave/
y
3
Waiting Room Chairs ^
1
Desk/
1
Office Chair
1
Computer
Terminal & Modem & Printer
Treatment
Area:
1
Adding Machine
1
Leg Curl'
1
Clock
/
1
Computerowv
1
Leg Press v
' , ^/Uu^
1
Total H i p ^
' ysAjji
1
Mettler Ultrasound^
1
Multiflex Stimulator^;
1
Scotsman Ice Machine^
2
Fitron Cycle^
1
Medmetric KT-1000v
7
Exam Tables w
^
1
Chattanoga Intelect Stim
1
Hydrocollator Hot Pack^
1
Whirlpool and Whirlpool Stand^
1
Mixing Valve *
1
Cast Cutter^
1
Leg Extension1
Pullover \/
1
Kin Com y'
1
Sani G r i n d e r ^
1
SandduneiX
1
UBE
1
Pilates Tables (Performer & Trapez)
1
Stair Master
1
Pro-Fitter
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
1
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REHAB: - 39th South
1
Nordic Track
1
Pedex
1
Pogo Ball
3
Medical Carts
3
Chairs
2
Stools
1
Freezer
1
Orthofeet System
1
Bio-Support Alignment System
1
Toaster Oven
10-20Pillows
Softgoods & Cast Supplies
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SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE
Assets Listing
May 1, 1990
PARK CITY:
Reception:
1
1
2

Desk with Attached Counter
File Cabinet
Office Chairs

Front Holding Area:
1
2

Wheeled Gurney
Wheelchairs

Exam Rooms:
3
1
3
4
3
2

Exam Tables
Wall Mounted Otoscope
Shelf Wall Units
Wooden Chairs
Stools
Office Chairs

Casting Area:
1
1
1

Stryker Gurney
Cabinet with Shelves
Wall-Mounted Light Box

X-Ray Room:
1
1
1
1
1

X-ray Table with Buclcy
Wall-Mounted Light Box
Wall-Mounted BucJcy
Toshiba Portable X-ray Machine
Free-Standing Lead Shield
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MR. MORRIS:
MR. GREEN:

Can I take a minute with him?
Sure.

MR. MORRIS:
MR. GREEN:

Let's go out for a second.
We're not going to be very much

longer.
(There was an attorney-witness
Q.

BY MR. GREEN:

discussion.)

Now, Doctor, the operation as

it existed in 1989 at the 39th South office -MR. MORRIS:

Before or after the

determination agreement - - n e v e r mind.
Q.

BY MR. GREEN:

-- in essence, moved over

here?
MR. MORRIS:
A.

Yes.

Q.

BY MR. GREEN:

Object to the form.

And it moved as a result of

the sale?
A.

Correct.
Let me just amend that, not to deviate.

It

moved here not as a result of the sale, it moved here
because of a desire to relocate.

The sale was

certainly not the event that led to a relocation, it
was a peripheral small piece of the puzzle.
Q.

Would you say it facilitated the move?

A.

It facilitated it because

Intermountain

Health Care insisted virtually on buying one-half of

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801) 521-5222
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Tempest
R e p o r t i n g . Inc.

'!lie;>!i'.r.e
l Sill I r>L'l-"

Post Ol'l'kv B«»x •>'" i
Salt Lake City, I'tar. > ; i P

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC. f/k/a
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,

Civil No. 9109063160ON
(Judge Homer Wilkinson)

Plaintiff,
-vSALT LAKE CITY KNEE &
SPORTS MEDICINE, a Utah
general partnership, and
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation, and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C., a
Utah professional
corporation, general
partners,

Deposition of:
THOMAS ROSENBERG. M.D.

Defendants.
-0Place:

SPORTS MEDICINE WEST
5848 South 300 East
Murray, Utah 84107

Date:

August 20, 1992
4:30 p.m.
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Reporter:

Kerry J . S o r e n s e n , CSR/RPR

23
Rosenberg, M.D. (Examination by Mr. Green)
1

MR. MORRIS:

2

MR. GREEN:

3

MR. MORRIS:

4

MR. GREEN:

5

Can I take a minute with him?
Sure.
Let's go out for a second.
We're not going to be very much

longer.

6

(There was an attorney-witness

7

Q.

8

11
12

MR. MORRIS:

Q.

BY MR. GREEN:

-- in essence, moved over

here?
MR. MORRIS:

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

BY MR. GREEN:

17

Before or after the

determination agreement -- never mind.

13

16

Now, Doctor, the operation as

it existed in 1989 at the 39th South office --

9
10

BY MR. GREEN:

discussion.)

Object to the form.

And it moved as a result of

the sale?
A.

18

Correct.
Let me just amend that, not to deviate.

It

19

moved here not as a result of the sale, it moved here

20

because of a desire to relocate.

21

certainly not the event that led to a relocation, it

22

was a peripheral small piece of the puzzle.

The sale was

23

Q.

Would you say it facilitated the move?

24

A.

It facilitated it because

25

Intermountain

Health Care insisted virtually on buying one-half of

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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Rosenberg/ M.D. (Examination by Mr. lireen;
1

physical therapy in order to develop an orthopedic

2

specialty hospital.

3

Q.

And I believe you testified that at all times

4

it was your intent to at least maintain a one-half

5

interest in the center, the 3900, or I think you

6

referred to it as the Rehabilitation Center?

7

A,

That one-half interest retained by

8

physicians, one-half ownership assumed by

9

Intermountain Health Care was an overriding principal

10
11

of the agreement to the Orthopedic Specialty Hospital.
Q.

Was it your intent -- at the time you entered

12

into the termination agreement which is Exhibit 4 to

13

this deposition, was it your intent at that time to

14

maintain one-half of the ownership?

15
16
17

A.

I don't think there was any particular intent

one way or the other.
Q.

You reviewed Paragraph 11 a moment ago, the

18

paragraph relating to the subsequent sale of the

19

center.

20

ever come in to play or become operative.

21

A.

22
23

The -MR. MORRIS:

Let me interpose an objection.

It calls for a legal conclusion.

24
25

Can you give me an example of when that would

You can go ahead.
A.

This would come in to play based on the

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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25
Rosenberg/ M.D. (Examination by Mr. Green)
1

agreement.

2

outright, which I'm. sure was a potential option at

3

that time --

4

Q.

If the physicians sold Rehabilitation

BY MR. GREEN:

I was under the impression

5

that your testimony was that it was your desire to

6

maintain a one-half interest at all times.

7

A.

No, that's incorrect.

It was a requirement

8

from Intermountain Health Care that they purchase one

9

half or else they would not enter further into

10

negotiations regarding a joint venture, Orthopedic

11

Specialty Hospital, et cetera.

12

expressed early by one of their key negotiators Gary

13

Franks

14

that stipulation was stated, and subsequent

15

negotiations were then directed

16

It was a principle

(phonetic), and I recall very specifically when

accordingly.

Prior to that time there was no -- there was

17

no physician-originated concepts of selling none,

18

one-half, all, et cetera.

19
20

Q.

Do you understand your ownership in Sports

Medicine West?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And doesn't -- or isn't it true that Sports

23

Medicine West owns all of the assets that were once at

24

3900 South?

25

MR. MORRIS:

Lack of foundation and the

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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r
IiROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
j! KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099)
|! CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
11One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
U201 South Main Street
11Salt Lake City, UT 84111
\\ (801) 537-5555
UAttorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
: SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
;! REHABILITATION, INC., fka
'PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
: VS.

! SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation and
: THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation, general partners,

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 910906316 CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1) (c) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, Defendants Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine,
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C.,
(referred to herein as "Defendants" or "Defendant Doctors")
respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment against Salt Lake Knee and Sports
Rehabilitation, Inc. ("Rehab").
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r

r
ARGUMENT

Rehab's

Memorandum

of

Points

and

Authorities

merely

(reinforces that summary judgment is proper under the undisputed
facts of this case and the controlling case authority, for two
!reasons:
i
I

J

1. Rehab raises no genuine factual issue disputing that
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold.
The record stands without dispute that the name was never
sold to IHC or any third party. Rehab even admits that none
of the agreements, schedules of assets, bills of sale, or
other documents reflecting or effecting the sale to IHC
mentioned or included the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center."

j
I
j
|
i
||

2. Rehab does not and cannot dispute the uncontroverted
fact that the price paid by IHC to the Defendants to acquire
certain intangible assets was not for good will, but as
consideration for non-competition agreements executed by the
Defendant Doctors.,
There is a further basis for summary judgment in this case,

I
!
j

jj Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2) (b) a party opposing summary judgment
!

|must specifically controvert the movant's statement of undisputed

i i

| j facts, stating the numbered

sentence or sentences that are

jl

ildisputed.

Rehab has failed to do that, because in good faith it

l!
j!cannot dispute those facts. Not a single numbered sentence of the
|!

jlmovant's facts are specifically referenced or disputed.

Rehab's

! i

•statement of disputed facts is simply a rambling argument that
11 does not address in any manner the vast majority of the numbered
• j

iI sentences in the Defendant Doctors statement of undisputed facts.
|jConsequently, pursuant to Rule 4-501 Defendants' statement of
i;undisputed

facts is deemed admitted for purposes of summary

;i ,

i judgment.
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f

I

POINT I

jj
|
||

THE NAME "SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER"
WAS NEVER SOLD AND CONSEQUENTLY PARAGRAPH 11 OF
, THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT HAS NO APPLICATION

I

The Defendant Doctors have no potential liability to Rehab,

jjif the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center11 was not sold to
IlIHC.
I!
|j
Si
II

Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement specifies:
"Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein
the purchaser acquires and pays consideration
for all of the following:..-ownership of the
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center,"....

11Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement, (emphasis added).
jj

This is so well established that Rehab admitted the same in

ijthe deposition of its principal, Gregory Gardner:
1
1
i i
ji
Q.
And in order for this paragraph 11 [of the Termination
!;
Agreement] to be triggered, it is true, is it not that
jj
your understanding that the name Salt Lake Sports
|!
Medicine Center had to be sold to a third party and
11
used by the third party after the sale?
A.
That is correct.
jiG. Gardner Deposition at 41, (emphasis added).
|i
lj
Dr. Lonnie Paulos, who negotiated the sale with IHC has
j

!

,

,

•

•

•

•

'

•

j;
jitestified unequivocally that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
jiCenter" was never sold to IHC or any third party.
Rehab's
Ii
j,Memorandum of Points and Authorities is unable to dispute that
i;

I;testimony or advance any evidence to the contrary.

Instead, it

jj
I! is forced to admit that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
;Center" is not even mentioned or identified in any contract, list
ij
•J'

'•

•

•
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(

I of assets, bill of sale or other document identifying the assets
i!acquired by or transferred to IHC.

Rehab concedes:

I
The Plaintiff admits that the name "Salt Lake
(I
Sports Medicine Center" does not appear as an
j|
asset generated pursuant to the transaction
|
resulting in the ownership of the Center by
11
the joint venture [IHC and Sports Medicine
;|
West].
11 Rehabilitation's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3.
!|
That admission is compelling evidence for summary judgment
j|in favor of the Defendant Doctors, for two reasons:
j!

First, the

|| Medicine

sale

of certain

assets

of

Center by the Defendant Doctors

Salt
to

Lake

Sports

IHC was

a very

;!sophisticated transaction, drafted, orchestrated and supervised
liby an army of lawyers on both sides of the transaction.

Reams of

illegal documents were generated documenting and identifying every
; asset being sold.

In addition, bills of sale were

; reflecting the transfer of title to such assets.

prepared

In that context,

M Rehab admits that none of these agreements, schedules, lists, or
jj bills of sale identified or included in the sale of the name:

|j
I j"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center".
As a matter of law, because
jj
j the parties did not agree or contract to sell that name and did
| not transfer title to it, it was not sold.
'.,
Second, Rehab's admission does not stand alone. Rather than
j;
i disputing material facts, Rehab f s admission corroborates and
r
I verifies the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos that the name Salt
; Lake Sports Medicine Center was not sold to IHC to any other third
Mparty.

It reinforces the deposition testimony of the principals
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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!of Rehab that they have no evidence that the name "Salt Lake

I
!Sports Medicine Center" was sold to IHC.
i
i

Gardner Deposition at

. .

141; Toole Deposition at 85.
|
Under these circumstances summary judgment is mandated by a
!long line of controlling case authority:1 The Utah Supreme Court
'has instructed:
|

Summary judgment is proper when the
pleadings and other documents before
the Court establish that there is no
basis for awarding the relief sought
by a litigant... [W]hen the best
showing a plaintiff could make would
not entitle him to recover under the
law, summary judgment is appropriate
and serves its intended purpose of
avoiding fruitless court proceedings
with their attendant costs and time
and money.

I

Larson v. Wycoff Co. . 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981) (emphasis
added).

That rule of law governs the undisputed facts of this

case. Rehab has made no showing that the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" was sold.

Therefore, it has no basis for the

relief sought, and dismissal of the complaint on summary judgment
is required as a matter of law.

:

S&G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735 (Utah
1996) (summary judgment affirmed on appeal; "'summary judgment is
appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law");
Reaaan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lunaen, 692 P.2d 776, 779
(Utah 1984) (the major purpose of summary judgment is to allow
the Court to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is
a genuine issue of fact); Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1172 (Utah
1983); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48
(1986); Digitized
Celotex
Corp. V. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r
I

In a desperate effort to manufacture a factual issue Rehab

j relies on a single sentence, out of context, from the affidavit
I of Gene Oakes, concerning the removal of the name "Salt Lake
I Sports Medicine"2 from the office space at 670 East 3900 South.
ilBut that statement does not create any material issue of disputed

j!
hfact. It has nothing to do with the fact that the name "Salt Lake
| Sports Medicine Center" was never sold to IHC or any third party.
jit does not contradict the affidavit of Dr. Paulos.

Neither does

II it dispute the admissions by Rehab that the provisions of
11
I
11 paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement are not triggered unless
ji

11 the name was sold, or that none of the documents effecting the
i'sale of assets to IHC mentioned, included or transferred the name
ii
i j

|i"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" to IHC. To the contrary, those
j! facts stand undisputed, punctuated by Rehabfs admissions.
jj.

A question of when a name was removed from the 3900 South

I jbuilding does not prevent summary judgment on the dispositive,
II undisputed issue that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center"
|!was never sold to IHC. The Utah Supreme Court has instructed that
jja dispute on an irrelevant or immaterial factual issue does not
i :
!i

ij bar summary judgment.
;!
:•
[\
i.
j:

We agree with Plaintiff's assertion
that there are genuine issues of fact
. ... However, the mere existence of
genuine issues of fact in the case as
a whole does not preclude the entry of
2

It should be noted that the name which Rehab claims was
^removed from the 3900 South building is not the name referred
Ijto in paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. That name is
:;"Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center".
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r

summary judgment if those issues are
immaterial to the resolution of the
case*
*

i

||

Horgan

v,

Industrial

Design

Corp. . 657

P.2d

751

(Utah

|1982)(emphasis added); Healar Ranch. Inc. v, Stillman, 619 P.2d
111390 (Utah 1980) (summary judgment is not precluded simply because
I!
jja fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is
Ii
|

j!genuinely controverted).
|j
|j

The attached Affidavit of Gene Oakes removes all doubt.

He

|junequivocally testifies that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
|j Center" was not intended to be, and was not, sold to IHC. He
|| further testifies that the cited paragraph from his prior
Ij

|jaffidavit was not intended to address the issue of ownership of
•j; the name.
;;

There are no material

facts in dispute.

The

Defendant

j|Doctors did not sell the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center"
:;to IHC or any third party.

Rehab has not, and cannot, produce a

I;shred of evidence to the contrary.

Consequently, summary judgment

|j is required as a matter of law.
i i.

li
||

POINT II
A PORTION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE PAID BY IHC
WAS ATTRIBUTED TO GOOD WILL

i!

j!

Dr. Lonnie Paulos, who negotiated and directed the sale of

[^certain assets of Defendant Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine to
ij IHC, has testified that IHC did not identify or value any good
11will

associated
it's
Instead,
Digitized by the Howardwith
W. Hunter Law
Library, J. purchase.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IHC

paid

r

C

consideration to induce the Defendant Doctors to execute a nonI competition agreement.
Rehab has not and cannot provide any competent evidence to
'the contrary.

Its principals have testified

they do not know

I whether IHC paid consideration for the non-competition covenants
II
JI executed by the Defendant Doctors.
I

" •

Further, no factual issues are raised by the testimony

JKirk Bennett, Rehab f s purported expert witness.

of

He cannot raise

i

la factual

issue

concerning

good will.

He merely

assumed

!purposes of his analysis that good will was the only

for

intangible

i

11asset and that IHC paid for good will.
|!he did

not

even

consider

in his

Indeed, he admitted that

analysis

the

non-competition

i j

j j agreements executed by the Defendant Doctors.

Neither did he make

ii

l•
.
jiany investigation or analysis to determine what is generally paid

i
! by
hospitals or HMOs buying medical practices to obtain non|jcompetition agreements.
Bennett Deposition at 105-107.
Mr.
|;Bennett's

testimony

merely

reveals

his

flawed,

unprincipled,

jhaphazard analysis, and demonstrates it does not satisfy even the
inmost rudimentary evidentiary standards.
J|

Rehab f s argument also ignores the controlling legal principle

j|that there can be no good will in a business that is dependent for
Hits existence upon an individual who conducts the enterprise and
|Iwould vanish if the individual left or entered into competition.
j I This

rule

limiting

the

scope

of good will was

established

11Steven v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1988):
!i

•II
I !

i;

i;
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•

•

.

'

.

in

o

o
There can be no good will in a business
that is dependent for its existence upon
the individual who conducts the enterprise they would vanish were the
individual to die, retire or quit work.

I!
j!
Ij

That is precisely the setting presented by this case.

If the

jDefendant Doctors were to compete with IHC, the patients and
I!practice IHC was attempting to acquire would disappear.
|the reason for the non-competition agreements.
ipaid consideration for the non-competition

That is

Consequently, IHC

agreements, not for

jI good will.
II

Rehab ! s argument also fails because good will is inextricably

11 tied to the business name.

Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d at 952.

|i ("The presence of good will may be evidenced by...[the] commercial
hname").

If the name is not sold, no good will passes.

As

j;indicated in Point I hereof, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
li
'
'
.
11 Center" was never sold to IHC or any third party. IHC did not
••

i

i j

11want to purchase the name because it did not perceive

it had any

i1
i

11value, and hence no good will.
11
Rehab ! s reliance on a boiler plate recital containing an
11

I;oblique abstract reference to good will is unavailing. There was
jj
lino good will identified or transferred
in any of the
|;transactional documents; IHC did not value any good will in its
Evaluation analysis which determined the purchase price; and the
|;Defendant Doctors received no payment for good will.

Any premium

!!
li •

! they received was for the non-competition agreements.
I of Dr. Paulos.
ii

Affidavit

Rehab has presented no evidence to the contrary.
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Likewise, Rehab f s reference
11 competition agreements:

to the

phrase

in

the non-

"to enhance the development of good will

IJ within the joint venture"r is misleading and actually cuts against
hits position.

That phrase refers to developing good will in the

li "joint venture" entity, which was formed after the sale of the
|j assets to IHC.

It does not refer to good will acquired by IHC by

M

11the purchase of assets.
i

|j

IHC did not value good will.

It did not pay for good will,

|j

jjand the Defendant Doctors did not receive any compensation for
j'good will.
!i
! I

II

POINT III

jj
jj
|j ""

THE ISSUES RAISED BY THIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTION ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR
ADJUDICATION

I
j|

j!

Rehab makes a one sentence argument that the summary judgment

11issues are not properly before the Court as a result of the ruling
11 of the Court of Appeals.
Only three lines —
and no case
11
i

11authority —

is devoted to that argument because it is without

j j

11merit.
jj

The Court of Appeals did not consider or dispose of the

I issues presented in this summary judgment motion.

These issues

11 were not raised in the prior summary judgment motion heard or

jj
I decided by this Court.

Neither were they addressed in briefs or

11in oral argument on appeal.
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The Court of Appeals can only consider and resolve issues
||first raised at the trial level. Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
IJ Co. , 659 P.2d

1040, 1044

(Utah 1983).

This Court has not

i

'previously ruled on whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
I Center" was sold to IHC.

Neither has it considered whether IHC

|[paid a premium to obtain covenants of non-competition from the
! j

II Defendant Doctors, rather than for good will.
Ijnot raised on appeal.

These issues were

The Court of Appeals did not consider,

l! resolve or even discuss them.
! i
i

j|

I t is axiomatic that an appellate c o u r t ' s ruling i s limited

j | to those issues specifically raised, considered and addressed in
jj
!|the trial court below and on appeal. The ruling does not extend
li
11to collateral matters not before the appellate court. DfAston v.
h Df Aston, 844 p.2d 345, 351 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) confirms this
j; controlling principle:

I;

j!'

Even when a judgment is ultimately reversed
on appeal..., the reversal does not
necessarily operate as an adjudication by
the appellate court of any question other
than those which were, in terms, discussed
and decided by the appellate court,
[citations omitted]. Thus, while a reversal
effectively invalidates the prior judgment
with respect to those issues addressed in
the appeal, it * extends only to those issues
which the appellate court decided in
actuality or by necessary implication; it
does not affect collateral matters not
before the court.' Aye v. Fix, 192 Mont.
141, 626 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Mont. 1981).

| j "The law of the case doctrine applies to an issue or issues that
11 have actually been decided.

The doctrine does not apply to
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r
I statements made by the Court in passing, or stated as possible
ijalternatives." 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.20[3] (3d ed.
11
IjMatthew Bender 1997).
I i

j
The corollary of these the rules is that the district court
li
i j retains jurisdiction on remand to consider issues, that were not
jj

II considered or decided by the appellate courts. 18 Moore's Federal
11Practice § 134.23[1][a] (3d ed. Matthew Bender 1997).

ij
•!
j|
j|
ij
|j
j|
11
ij

Although the District Court owes obedience
to the mandate of the Appellate Court, it
retains jurisdiction under the mandate rule
to reconsider issues on remand that were not
expressly or implicitly decided by the
Appellate Court.
A District Court can,
after remand, come to the same result as
before remand by relying on grounds other
than those specified in the Appellate
Court's mandate.

j Id.
Consequently, the issues raised by this summary judgment
I!motion are properly before this court for adjudication. They were
;!never raised, considered or decided by the Court of Appeals.
iI
j j •

ii

I!
j!
]!

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein summary judgment in favor

p of the Defendant Doctors is proper.

There is no genuine dispute

ii

i:of material fact and summary judgment is proper as a matter of
j: law.

Ii
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DATED t h i s ^ f V d a y

of January, 1998.

gyifV"^

ROBERT S. CAMPB-ELI^
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON
of and for
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center,
i
i

I Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
184111, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b),
.'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DEFENDANTS REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon:
John C. Green, Esq.
Kim M. Luhn, Esq.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by hand delivery on this £~J day of January, 1998.
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
GENE OAKES
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation and
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation, general partners,

Civil No. 910906316 CN

vs.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

State of Utah

•)
ss.
County of Salt Lake )
Gene Oakes, being first duly sworn and otherwise competent to
testify, hereby deposes and states as follows:
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
1. Digitized
I am
a Machine-generated
certifiedOCR,public
accountant and at all times
may contain errors.

r,

r.

|manager for the defendants.
i
11
2. I testify to all matters herein from personal knowledge.
II

3.1 was intimately involved with Dr. Lonnie Paulos and Dr.

I Thomas Rosenberg in negotiating the sale of certain assets of
\\ Defendants1 to IHC.
4.

That sale was consummated by an Asset Purchase Agreement,

and other agreements, documents and instruments dated on or about
11May 24, 1990.
11

5.

In

connection

with

the

analysis

and

negotiations

||concerning that sale, I advised and consulted with Dr. Paulos and
;JDr. Rosenberg, and am familiar with the assets that were sold, and
||

lithe assets that were not sold to IHC pursuant thereto.
||

II-

6.

In these negotiations IHC did not desire or request to

i|
H

jipurchase the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center."

Neither did

i|

lithe joint venture company, Sports Medicine West.
|;decided to use the name Sports Medicine West.

Instead, they

i'

j|
7. Consequently, the Defendants did not sell or transfer the
I!
| | " S a l t Lake S p o r t s Medicine C e n t e r " t o IHC or any t h i r d p a r t y .
ij
ji
8. That is why the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center"
h
jjwas not mentioned or referred to in the Asset Purchase Agreement or
j•

| any of the documents related thereto, or bills of sale related

W

*.. .

|! thereto.
jj
9. On or about August 30, 1993, I signed a prior affidavit in
!! this case.
In paragraph 5 of that affidavit I stated the
l! following:
h
! i
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After the Defendants and IHC Hospitals, Inc.
entered into the IHC Agreement, those parties
changed the name on the door of the Center,
the marque in the lobby and two monument signs
located on the building exterior at 3900 South
and 700 East approximately one year before the
Plaintiff's filed their lawsuit in October,
1991.
10.

By that statement I simply intended to communicate that

the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine" was removed from the building
at 39th South and 7th East, as indicated.

It was not my intent to

indicate that IHC, Sports Medicine West, or any other party
acquired an ownership interest in that name.

As I have testified

above, they did not.
DATED this 22> day of January, 1998.

GENE OAKES

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before\m:
1998,

My Commission Expires;
—- ^

m

-*j~

A

A

A

A

~

«**—*. -^-->» -c •••
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
|!Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and that
J| in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of Civil
|! Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
ji

jGENE OAKES was served upon:
jj
John C. Green, Esq.
'j
Kim M. Luhn, Esq,
II
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
ji
722 Boston Building
|l
9 Exchange Place
!j
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
jiby Hand-Delivery on this
day of January, 1998.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; DIV. 1

SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

Reporter's Transcript of
Hearing on Defendants'
Motion for Summary
Judgment

vs.
Case No. 910906316CN
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general partnership,
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., P.C., a
Utah professional corporation, and
THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C., a
Utah professional corporation,
general partners,

Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson

COPY

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of January.
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing in Courtroom No. 502
of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 before the Honrable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in
the Third Judicial District, State of Utah.
APPEARANCES
JOHN C. GREEN. Attorney-at-LawT Green & Luhn, P.C.,
722 Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone 531-7444 Fax 531-8885 appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff.
MESSRS. ROBERT S. CAMPBELL. JR.. Attorney-at-Law;
and KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON. Attorney-at-Law, Campbell, Maack &
Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt
Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone 537-5555 Fax 537-5199 appearing on
behalf of the Defendants.
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1
2

(Whereupon, at the

commencement

3

of the instant proceedings,

4

counsel

5

actually aloud, Happy Birthday to

6

the Honorable Court

7

particularly

8

who counsel were making

9

attempt

from both sides sang,

-- an event

recordworthy

given

the

-- after which, the

10

following proceedings were had in

11

open

court:)

12
13

THE COURT:

Thank y o u , I think.

14

(Laughter)

15

the case of Salt Lake Knee and Sports

16

Salt Lake Knee and Sports m e d i c i n e ,

17
18

21
22
23

versus

This comes before the court on the
defendant's motion for summary

19
20

The matter before the court is

MR. CAMPBELL:

judgment.

Y e s , your H o n o r ; it

does.
THE COURT:

You may proceed when

you're

ready.
MR. CAMPBELL:

Thank y o u , your Honor.

24

Robert Campbell and Kevin Anderson

25

defendant Salt Lake K n e e .
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for the

2

MR. GREEN:

John Green for the

3

p l a i n t i f f s , your H o n o r ,

4

MR, CAMPBELL:

May it please the court,

5

this is a matter

that's before the court on

6

summary judgment on the strength that, as a

7

matter of law, there are no genuine

8

of material

9

trial, but that would permit a trial to be

fact that not only

issues

require

10

held in this case, and that defendant

11

Lake Knee is entitled

12

matter of law.

13

Salt

to judgment as a

As a matter of law, your Honor,

14

b e c a u s e , your Honor, there's not an issue,

15

foundational

16

triggered

17

Lake Rehab

18

refer to the plaintiff

19

sometimes as "Rehab,," and the defendant Salt

20

Knee sometimes as "Salt Lake Knee;" the whole

21

name was Salt Lake Knee and Sports M e d i c i n e .

22

issue to been tried, that would

have

the entitlement of the p l a i n t i f f s , Salt
-- and if it pleases your Honor,

I'll

as Salt Lake Rehab, or

But in any event, your H o n o r , the

23

is well aware of what the -- both

24

availability of Rule 56 i s , and also

25

obligation of the court under Rule 5 6 .

Lake

court

the
the
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Argument

1

And the issue, your Honor, is that

2

there's a foundational question of fact that is

3

missing

4

proof, without which there can been no showing of

5

entitlement

from the plaintiff's proof, from

6

Rehab•s

to a jury trial.

And if we did go to trial

-- this case

7

is now set for trial in about two-plus w e e k s , for

8

three days

9

would be no evidence that would entitle a jury to

-- if it were to go to trial, there

10

make a finding on one key issue

11

two, but I'm going to principally, your Honor,

12

argue just one issue this m o r n i n g .

13

--

or, actually

Your Honor, there's the -- we

start

14

from the premise of the Reagan

15

Advertising

16

summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary

17

by allowing the parties to pierce

18

and determine whether there's a genuine issue to

19

present

20

Outdoor

case, that the major purpose of

the pleadings

to the fact finder. __
In accordance with this p u r p o s e ,

21

specific

22

there's a genuine issue for t r i a l .

23

trial,

facts are required

to show whether

The allegations of a p l e a d i n g , of

24

factual conclusions of an a f f i d a v i t ,

25

insufficient

are

to raise a genuine issue of fact.
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Argument

4
1

And with that, your Honor, let me
the court's well aware of the

turn

2

-- because

3

judgment

4

let me turn, if the court p l e a s e , to one of the

5

key paragraphs

6

dispute between Rehab and Sports M e d i c i n e .

standards in this jurisdiction

summary
-- but

that is at the heart of the
i

7

And, Judge, whether we take the time, a

8

few minutes

this morning, or whether we

take

9

three d a y s , we're going to be talking about

one

10

specific paragraph in the contract, in the

11

termination agreement b.etween these two p a r t i e s ,

12

And that's Paragraph 1 1 .

13

This is the paragraph, your H o n o r .

<

We

14

put this up in hopes it might be of some help to

15

your Honor.

16

Purchase of the Center.

17

w i t h i n Two

18

A g r e e m e n t , Physicians

19

Sports Medicine

20

p a r t y , Rehabilitation

21

here

22

that portion of the purchase price which is

23

attributed

'

And it reads as follows: "The
It is agreed that if
i

24
25

(2) years from the date of
"--

this

Salt Lake Knee

and

-- "sells the Center to any
"-- that's the

-- "shall be entitled

third

plaintiff

to one third

(1/3) of
(

to goodwill.
"Sale," your H o n o r , "shall be

defined

as a transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and
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Argument

*

5
1

pays consideration

2

following:

3

for all" -- for all -- "of the

"The Center's lease on the

Leased

4

P r e m i s e s , ownership of the name

'Salt Lake

Sports

5

Medicine Center,' all of the equipment and other

6

assets located at the Center, the

7

patients and accounts receivable, and whereby

8

purchaser"

9

Salt Lake Knee sells to the third party

Center's

-- in other w o r d s , if Physicians

or

--

10

"whereby

11

operational control of the business of the

12

and continues operating under the same name at

13

the same

14

the purchaser assumes

the

complete
Center

location,"
Now, if the court p l e a s e , we brought

15

this motion before the court on the basis that --

16

two b a s e s , and I'm going to address

17

principally

18

your Honor, there's no evidence that the

19

b e t w e e n the Physicians, or between Salt Lake

20

K n e e , and IHC, which is the one that's

21

triggered

22

evidence that that sale, your H o n o r , included

23

name

24
25

in the argument

one

this morning

-- that,
sale

supposedly

this clause, Paragraph 1 1 , there's no
the

"Salt Lake Sports Center."
And that's the definition of a sale.

There is -- not only is there, your H o n o r , no
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Argument

o

1

evidence of that -- and if the court were to hear

2

it, the court w i l l , N o . 1, note

3
4

this:

Your Honor, Rehab, even in their brief
on this m o t i o n , have said this to the court.

5

The plaintiff

admits that the name

6

"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" does not

7

appear as an asset generated pursuant

8

transaction resulting

9

Center by the joint venture IHC and

10

to the

in the ownership of

the

Sports

Medicine.

11

This is the deposition, your H o n o r , of

12

M r . Gardner, the principal

13

plaintiff.

14

for Rehab, the

I asked him the question:
QUESTION:

And in order for

this

15

Paragraph 11 to be triggered, it is true, is it

16

n o t , that your understanding

is the name

17

Lake Sports Medicine Center 1

had to be sold

18

the third party and used by the third party

19

the

'Salt
to
after

sale?

20

ANSWER:

21

QUESTION:

That's

correct.

Can you point to any

22

document or writing in which you are

23

that the name

24

Center' was sold by Salt Lake

25

Medicine Center to IHC as part of the

'Salt Lake Sports

aware

Medicine

Sports
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Argument

1

transaction

that followed in May of

2

ANSWER:

N o , I couldn't

3

That was the answer.

1990?

tell y o u .

And the other

4

Rehab p r i n c i p a l , your Honor, M r . Douglas Toole,

5

also testified to the same

6

QUESTION:

thing.

You have no knowledge or

7

information

8

Medicine Center or Sports Medicine

9

was sold to IHC?

10
11

ANSWER:

that the name Salt Lake

Sports
Center

I don't know that the name was

sold, n o .

12

So we stand before

the court, your

13

H o n o r , with that testimony on the part of

14

plaintiff.

15

the

That's what they would prove.
This is the testimony

that is

16

uncontradicted.

And this is the testimony, your

17

H o n o r , before the court, of D r . Paulos for Salt

18

Lake Knee, Paragraph 11 of the affidavit:

19

"Neither the name

20

Center' nor any interest therein was sold or

21

otherwise conveyed to IHC or any third party."

22

And, further, this is the p r i n c i p a l ,

'Salt Lake Sports

Medicine

23

your Honor, who helped in the negotiations

24

IHC for Salt Lake Knee, for D r . Paulos

25

Rosenberg.

with

and
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Argument

1
2

He testified

that Salt Lake

Sports

Medicine Center, again the name was not

3

sold.

So, if the court p l e a s e , what we of

4

before the court is a fact that is not

5

has not been proved by the p l a i n t i f f , and is

6

therefore missing in the linkage of evidence.

7

--

that

There is, your H o n o r , one position

8

plaintiff has raised in opposition

9

motion.

that

to this

And what they say is this, your Honor.

10

They say that the Court of A p p e a l s , in

11

this appeal, the Court of A p p e a l s , your H o n o r ,

12

stated that there was only one issue remaining

13

the case.

14

whether there was a sale of the name but

15

the name was actually used after the actual

16

to IHC.

17

addressing

And that wasn't the question

of
whether
sale

And there's a statement in the -- this

18

is the last paragraph, your H o n o r , of the

19

of Appeals opinion in this c a s e .

20

And it reads.

Court

"Finally, according

21

the p a r t i e s , the only remaining

22

the joint venture continued operating

23

business under the name

24

Medicine

25

in

issue his

'Salt Lake

to

whether

the

Sports

Center1."
No place in the appeal was the issue of
C a m p b e l l : Principal
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Argument

1

whether

the sale included

2

Sports M e d i c i n e ' ever raised or discussed by the

3

appellant or the defendant.

4

say, your Honor, I'm

5

cut this u p .

6

only quote I have quoted is the first p a r t .

7

the name

Thus

'Salt Lake

-- and I should

sorry; this is the way we

This is not part of the quote.

This is my statement:

The

What the Court

8

of Appeals

said and what was before your

Honor

9

are two different things, your H o n o r , and

there's

10

a legion of cases saying that a Court of A p p e a l s ,

11

an appellate court, can only decide the

12

that have been

13

issues

raised.

And, Judge, we of looked and looked

14

vain for any -- and I want counsel

15

court where it is, where it i s , that they have

16

raised, Rehab raised on appeal to the Court of

17

Appeals

18

a sale, that is to say a sale of the n a m e , what

19

we're talking about here.

20

to tell

in

the

-- the issue of whether or not there was

The court was focusing on whether

21

constituted

a third party, and this court

22

n o , because you -- initially, you said n o ,

23

because Salt Lake Knee, the P h y s i c i a n s ,

24

retained an interest, one-half

25

only sold a half of an interest.

interest,

IHC

said

actually
they
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Argument

10
1

But the Court of Appeals has ruled
We're not here to talk about that.

on

2

that.

3

J u d g e , nobody

4

looked at the oral argument in the case, nobody

5

raised before the Court of Appeals

6

specifically

7

issue of whether or not the name was sold.

8

isn't any writing

9

all.

10

-- I've

But,

looked at the b r i e f s ,

the plaintiff

--

-- no one raised

the
There

to that effect, Judge; none at

And accordingly, when the court said --

11

Court of Appeals

12

parties

13

case, judge.

14

show the court what the briefs look like.

15

said, "and according

to the

the only remaining issue," that isn't
We've got the briefs h e r e ;

Nobody raised this issue.

i
the

I'll

And if the

16

court

17

in dictum in observation, that's all it i s .

18

I've

-- if the Court of Appeals wants to

engage

But their court runs its own b u s i n e s s .

19

And there is an old story that perhaps I don't

20

need to tell your Honor, but about a federal

21

district court judge sitting in V i r g i n i a ,

22

sitting in an actual deposition

23

couldn't get any witnesses

24

Justice Berger, because there had been a call

25

from the English judiciary, from the Lord

upon
{

-- because they

-- told by

Chief
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Argument

1

Chancellors

to the Chief Justice's

office

2

apparently wondering what an American judge was

3

doing effectively holding court in England.

4

And the Chief Justice called

5

Merich -- who had been on the bench a long time,

6

in the Fourth Circuit

7

by any chance have you been in England

8
9
10

Judge

-- and said, Judge M e r i c h ,

And Judge Merich, said,

lately?

"your H o n o r ,

Chief Justice, I f l l answer that two w a y s :
yes, I have.

11

And, N o . 2, I don't work

And that's very true.

N o . 1,

for you."

And this

12

doesn't work for anybody else.

13

doesn't work for the Court of A p p e a l s .

14

understands what the Court of Appeals did, and we

15

understand

16

This

court

court
It

the rule of stare d e c i s i s .
But the rule of res judicata,

17

issue was never raised.

18

counsel show the court where it is, where

the

19

issue of whether or not the sale included

the

20

sale of the name is, because it clearly

21

And I'd

this

like to see

And we are entitled, your H o n o r , to a

22

trial on that issue and to a decision on

23

issue.

24
25

isn't.

that

And what that same Court of Appeals
said, your Honor, in the D'Aston

c a s e , is

this:
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1

"Even when a judgment is ultimately

2

a p p e a l . . . , the reversal does not

3

operate as an adjudication by the appellate

4

of any question other than those w h i c h w e r e , in

5

terms, discussed

6

court.

7

reversed

necessarily

and decided by the

"Thus, while a reversal

8

invalidates

9

those issues addressed

court

appellate

effectively

the prior judgment with respect
in the a p p e a l , it

10

only to those issues which the appellate

11

decided in actuality or by necessary

12

It does not affect collateral m a t t e r s not

13

the court."

14

on

to

extends
court

implication.
before

And this issue wasn't there, your

15

Honor.

16

court.

And, accordingly, it's back before

17

The Court of Appeals never

this

addressed

18

this issue, your H o n o r ; they never considered

19

They never decided it.

20

They never precluded

21

on remand, whether the name

22

Medicine1

23

was

its

it.

consideration

'Salt Lake

Sports

sold.

And w e , therefore, your H o n o r , are in a

24

position in which this central issue sale

shall

25

be defined as all of the following: ownership
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Arg

1

the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine

2

Center.

Your Honor, there's other case law I

3

could talk about and review with the court, but

4

this is the principal question, and I submit to

5

the court we can lodge with your Honor copies of

6

the appellate b r i e f s .

7

There's no one who has stated

8

only did no one state

9

of fact is whether or not the name was

-- not

"the only remaining

issue

actually

10

used after the sale," but there's no statement by

11

any of the p a r t i e s .

12

And maybe M r . Green can improve

13

m i n d s , but he didn't do so in his b r i e f .

14

he says he stipulates.

15

our
In fact

What are we going to do? W e ' r e going

16

forget this particular clause in the contract

17

pretend

18

actually

19

shall include the ownership of the n a m e ,

20

Lake Sports

21

it doesn't exist, that the parties

to
and

didn't

say that, for a sale to take p l a c e , it
'Salt

Medicine'?

I submit to the court that there's not

22

an issue before the court on this, and as a

23

matter of law this court may enter

24

and in fact must -- summary judgment.

25

w e ' r e entitled to a trial, and there isn't

-- and

should

Because
going
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Argument

14
1

to be any evidence before the court on this

2

issue.

3

And the court would have to

instruct

4

the jury to direct a verdict in favor of

5

Physicians or Salt Lake Knee.

6

Judge, there's another issue that is

7

before the court, and under our m o t i o n .

And

8

is whether or not goodwill was involved in the

9

sale.

Because going back to the initial

--

that

the

10

issue of whether or not this sale to IHC, if it

11

was a sale

12

we're not going to argue that -- shall be

13

entitled

14

which is attributable

to one-third of that purchase

15
16

-- and the Court of Appeals said so;

to g o o d w i l l .

The evidence, your Honor

i
-- the

issue

is whether or not there was g o o d w i l l .

17

{

And the evidence upon the part of the

18

plaintiffs

19

was $662,000

20

of D r . Lonnie Paulos.

21

price

is that there was not g o o d w i l l .
-- this is from the affidavit

"IHC did not identify or value

There
also

any

22

goodwill associated with any assets in w h i c h it

23

acquired an interest

24

M e d i c i n e , nor did it allocate any portion of the

25

$662,225.00 purchase price to goodwill associated

from Salt Lake

Sports
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Argument

j

1

therewith.

2

"As part of the Asset

Purchase

3

Agreement with IHC, Dr. Rosenberg

4

requested

5

pursuant

6

compete w i t h IHC or with the medical

7

being purchased by IHC from u s . "

8
9

to sign a noncompetition

and I were
agreement

to which we agreed that we would

not

practices

The $662,000, your H o n o r , was
substantially attributable

to two of

the

10

outstanding orthopedic

11

western United States agreeing that they

wouldn't

12

compete w i t h this joint venture in which

Salt

13

Lake Knee was a -- and Dr. Paulos went on, your

14

H o n o r , in Paragraph 1 4 , to say:

15

sports physicians

in the

"It was my intent and understanding

in

16

negotiating and executing that agreement

17

multiples paid by IHC to acquire an interest

18

practices

19

the aforesaid clinics, and any related assets,

20

was in consideration

21

practices

22

the Eighth Avenue clinic and the Park City

23

for the execution by us of the

24

non-competition

25

that any
in

that Dr. Rosenberg and I maintained

for the patients

at

and

that D r . Rosenberg and I maintained

at

Clinic

aforesaid

agreement.

"No part of the purchase price of IHC
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16
1

to acquire an undivided one-half interest

2

practices

3

Dr. Rosenberg and me were allocated

4

goodwill

5

Center."

6

in the

and clinics maintained and operated by

involving

to any

the Salt Lake Sports

Medicine

And that's the evidence, your H o n o r , on

7

the part of the defendant,

I will c o n c e d e , your

8

Honor, that in the purchase agreement between

9

and Salt Lake K n e e , the Physicians, there's

IHC

some

10

generic language as to what assets were sold; not

11

the name, but it does refer to g o o d w i l l .

12

My client is saying there

wasn't

13

anything allocated; there were no m o n i e s

14

allocated

15

to goodwill.
And we submit that that is the state of

16

the evidence.

17

plaintiff

that the court will see in w h i c h

18

plaintiff

can show to the court that there was in

19

fact -- that the par-ties negotiated

20

paid to my clients, the Physicians, a sum of

21

money for goodwill.

22

No evidence on the part of

the

and paid IHC,

But I do concede that that

phrase

23

"goodwill" is in a generic setting in the

24

particular assets that were

25

the

conveyed.

We've made it a part of the

summary
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1 /

1

judgment m o t i o n ,

2

evidence, at the least for the plaintiff

3

on that issue, that that precludes

4

judgment•

5

I think there may be

enough
to argue

summary

But, Judge, not on this question of

6

whether or not the agreement included a sale of

7

the n a m e ; and that, we've submitted

8

is a matter

9

for summary

to the court,

judgment.

And it is an issue that haunts

the

10

plaintiff's position in this case, and it will

11

remain the case, because there's no evidence of

12

that.

13

And all that the plaintiff

can hang

14

their hat on is this obiter dictum statement

15

the Court of A p p e a l s .

16

of

But those people up there, Judge in the

17

Court of A p p e a l s , over on Second South and

18

E a s t , they didn't have anything before them

19

allowed them to enter into a statement like that.

20

They had nothing; there were no

21

raised and there was no argument m a d e , and

22

there's nothing cited for that statement.

23

you.

Fifth
that

issues

Thank

24
25
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1

MR, GREEN:

Your Honor, I believe

2

the memorandum of the plaintiff

3

opposition

4

developed and answers all of

5

assertions with regard to why

6

judgment should be granted

7

that

in

to this motion has been

fully

counsel's
summary

the defendant.

However, I would just like to address a

8

couple of matters that counsel

talked

9

First of a l l , the dicta that counsel

referred

10

in the decision came just before the

conclusion

11

or basically

12

says is, "Finally, according

13

only remaining issue his whether

14

venture continued operating

15

the name

to the p a r t i e s , the
the

joint

the business

under

Center.'

"The trial court did not reach

17

issue, notwithstanding disputed, material

18

having resolved

19

ofassets.

20

this
facts,

the matter on the issue of

"Because of the existence of
facts, the issue of w h e t h e r

sale

disputed

21

material

22

venture continued

23

the same name is remanded to the trial court

24

determination."

25

to

the ruling, and actually what it

'Salt Lake Sports Medicine

16

about.

the

to operate the business

joint
under
for

Now, those facts, those issues of fact,
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1

still remain to be resolved.

2

believe that, based on the dicta of the

3

court, and its subsequent decision, that

4

the defendant

5

for the first time in this very

6

litigation.

7

Quite

is barred from raising

frankly, we
appellate
frankly

this

lengthy

In other w o r d s , even if it is not

8

barred, there are facts in dispute with

9

not only to the sale of the n a m e , but the

10

issue

of goodwill

11

regard
issue

itself.

In our memorandum in opposition, we do

12

cite the court to the case of Sorensen v.

13

Sorensen, which is 769 p.2d 820, w h i c h

14

defines what goodwill is, for example.

15

And it goes through a rather

basically

lengthy

16

d e f i n i t i o n , but states that advantage or --

17

goodwill

18

is defined a s :
"...an advantage or benefit which is

19

acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere

20

value of the capital stock, funds, or property

21

employed

22

public patronage and encouragement w h i c h it

23

receives

24

account of its local position, or

25

celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence,

therein, in consequence of the general

from constant or habitual c u s t o m e r s , on
common
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Argument

1

or punctuality, or from other

2

circumstances or necessities, or even

3

ancient partialities or p r e j u d i c e s . "

4

It goes on:
is referred

accidental
from

"In the accounting
to generally as

field,

5

goodwill

'the

6

summation of all the special a d v a n t a g e s , not

7

otherwise

8

concern.'

identifiable, related to a going

9

"It includes such items as good n a m e ,

10

capable staff and personnel, high

11

standing, reputation

12

services, and favorable

13

THE COURT:

14

you.

15

entitled

16

of g o o d w i l l .

for superior products

and

location."

Mr. Green, let me

I'm not persuaded

17

credit

that

interrupt

they're

to summary judgment on the

subject

I think goodwill is what you just

read

18

there, it raises issues of fact, and you would be

19

entitled

to put on evidence as far as g o o d w i l l .

20

So, as far as that issue is

21

and after hearing M r . Campbell, I'm

22

persuaded

23

summary judgment on goodwill.

24

issue, I'm

25

concerned,

still

there's sufficient evidence

not

to grant

But the

first

still out on that.
MR. GREEN:

Well, your H o n o r , again, we
Green: Responsive
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1

believe that -- also we cite the court to

2

South Utah Mortuary v. Olpin in our

3

memorandum,

4

goodwill can't be transferred out -- I mean

5

goodwill in and of itself is not

6

transferable, but whether it is -- w h e n

7

there's a sale of a b u s i n e s s , such as we had

8

here, goodwill goes with it,

9

and that what we're saying

And we say, according

to Sorensen,

10

a good n a m e , many times name is a part of

11

sale as w e l l .

12

In this particular

is

that

that

instance, there's no

13

specific reference to the name, but again we say

14

that there's evidence before the court that

15

used the n a m e .

16

the sale from the Physicians to IHC for at

17

four m o n t h s .

18

they

They used the name subsequent

to

least

And we say that the use of the name

19

constitutes a purchase of that n a m e , and

20

therefore even if the appellate court

hadn't

21

barred this issue, there's sufficient

facts

22

are material and are disputed with regard to that

23

issue, that I believe the court would be

24

precluded

25

issue alone.

that

from granting summary judgment on that
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22
1

THE C O U R T :

How do you get around

the

2

express language of the contract, where it

3

says that all-- and it indicates

4

-- that shall be sold?

5

of

four

items

And the name is one

them?

6

MR. GREEN:

W e l l , again, I believe

7

either the parties or the court itself

8

with all of those issues.

that
dealt

9

The issue before the appellate court --

10

and we would submit that the only reason that the

11

appellate court didn't rule specifically on that

12

name is because

13

your Honor

14

witnesses with regard to their credibility

15

determine whether or not they did in fact use

16

n a m e , whether or not the use of the name for any

17

period of time would in fact constitute a

18

purchase of that particular

19

it wanted to refer it back

to

to make the decision, to look at the
and
the

item.

I m e a n , in this sale, a g a i n , your

20

H o n o r , they did obtain complete

21

control.

22

IHC constituted

The court determined

operational
that the sale to

a saile to a third p a r t y .

23

There was certainly a sale of

the

24

patient list, and the receivables, and there was

25

certainly a sale of the equipment.
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1
2

Now, specifically
that goodwill was

3
4

6

Where did the court

that goodwill was
MR, GREEN:

THE C O U R T :

find

sold?
W e l l , in finding

the -- or at least it was

7

found

sold,

THE C O U R T :

5

the court's

that

included.

W e l l , if we go to trial on

8

this m a t t e r , and the defendants call

9

clients to the stand, and ask them if

10

goodwill

11

Lake Sports Medicine was sold, and

12

answer the way they did in the deposition,

13

how am I to rule or is a jury to rule?

14

-- or ask them if the name

your

MR. GREEN:

Salt
they

W e l l , your Honor, in the

15

deposition, I mean that -- they didn't

16

them to any of the contracts, and in fact my

17

clients weren't even party to the

18

that gave rise to this sale.

19

between IHC and the Physicians.

20

control over that.

21

refer

contracts

This was

I mean we're either arguing

We had no

substance

22

over form, either they sold the entire b u s i n e s s ,

23

including

24

submit that the evidence will show

that

25

subsequent

to the

the n a m e , or they didn't.

to the sale, subsequent

But we would

Green: Responsive
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1

transfer of the assets, subsequent

to the

2

transfer of operational control, subsequent

to

3

all of that, they continued

'Salt

4

Lake Sports Medicine C e n t e r 1 .

5

that should constitute a sale,

6

THE COURT:

to use the name

And on that b a s i s ,

You said they used it for

7

approximately

four m o n t h s .

8

long time?

9

for them to scratch the name off the door.

That's almost the time it

10

MR. GREEN:

11

in controversy.

12

THE COURT:

13
14

you

Is that a very
takes

Actually, those facts
We have

--.

I'm

just quoting

from what

I'm

saying at least

said.
MR. GREEN:

they

15

acknowledged

16

least that period of time.

17

affidavits

18

disinterested parties that can indicate

19

that name was not removed

20

year and a half.

21

are

the use of the name for at
We

in our memorandum

have

from

totally
that

for a period of

And that it was only removed

in

22

response to this lawsuit.

And, a g a i n , we

23

b e l i e v e , on that, you know -- I m e a n in order

24

the court, you know,, to buy their p o s i t i o n , it

25

would almost seem that you would have to

find
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1

that, you know, the name had no value w h a t s o e v e r ,

2
3

And y o u can't do that in terms of what
the facts are before this court,

4

THE COURT:

Of course you want me to

5

rule here that, although there was

nothing

6

in the contract anyplace w h i c h

7

states that the name Salt Lake Sports

8

is part of the sale when it's sold, you want

9

me to imply the actions of the parties

expressley

10

the goodwill that went w i t h it, that

11

name itself was

12

Center

and

the

sold.

Am I then rewriting the contract or am

13

I -- do I have to look at the four corners of

14

this contract to make any

15

MR. GREEN:

decision?

Your H o n o r , I just

think

16

that, under the circumstances, this -- these

17

c o n t r a c t s , and the contracts that y o u have

18

to look at, were prepared

19

sales agreements

20

defendants

21

in this case.

They should be construed against
therefore.

23

termination agreement also.

25

the

-- were all p r e p a r e d by the

22

24

-- at least

They actually prepared

them,

the

B u t , you know, the entire p a c k a g e w e n t ,
and w e ' r e saying that, pursuant to U t a h law, and
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1

the cases cited, that the name is included.

2

since they used the name, then, there's no

3

question but that they purchased i t .

4

THE COURT:

And

Of course you say the use

5

of the name

--• and I don't remember

6

in your material

7

name for a year and a half.

8

say

reading

-- but that they used
Did

the

somebody

that?

9

, MR. GREEN:

10

THE COURT::

Who was

11

MR. GREEN:

We have the affidavits

Yes.
that?
of

12

two totally unrelated

-- or, p a r t i e s

13

unrelated

14

M r . M a y e r , who indicated

15

not

16

year and a half, and that it came

17

pursuant to or in response to the l a w s u i t ;

18

at least those outside signs.

to this lawsuit; M r . Beers

and

that this did

-- they did not come down for at least a
down

19

THE COURT:

20

response to the

lawsuit?

21

MR. GREEN:

Pardon.

22

THE COURT:

Why did it come down in

23

response to the

24

MR. GREEN:

25

Why did it come down

in

lawsuit?
We don't k n o w , your H o n o r .

We're just assuming that when they became
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1

involved in the claims with the lawsuit/

2

that they thought/

3

name."

4

"we better get rid of

And we think that's

THE COURT:

--.

That's an indication

5

didn't own the name and they thought

6

better get r i d o f

7

MR. GREEN:

It also indicates

they'd

they used

it your Honor/ continued to use i t #

9

continued to utilize that n a m e .
part of what they were

11

they

it.

8

10

the

That was

selling.

You know, I would submit/ your Honor/

12

again/

there was a contract entered

13

these parties/ and they established, you know,

14

that there was -- that my clients were

15

to money for/ you know, a third of the g o o d w i l l .

16

into

between

entitled

We're just submitting at this point

17

time that, you know, there had to be

some

18

consideration there.

know,

19

continued; they sold it.

20

going

They then, you

They sold the

in

entire

concern.

21

I mean Paulos, for example, is now

22

saying

for first time in the lawsuit

23

extra money went to noncompetition.

24

nothing

25

was attributable

that

the

There's

in the documents that says that any money
to those n o n c o m p e t i t i o n s .

Gr
e eLaw
n :School,
Responsive
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1

But there's indication that, you k n o w ,

2

that money should be attributed

3

that is in the agreement between Paulos and I H C .

4

THE COURT:

to g o o d w i l l , and

I have no problem w i t h

5

that.

6

still have a problem where it

7

states ownership of the name

8

Sports Medicine

9

I have no problem with that.

But I

specifically
'Salt Lake

Center'.

And that is one of the terms of

the

10

contract.

11

I had it -- when I ruled three years ago, and I

12

was wrong, M r . Green.

13

Of course I have this same problem

MR. GREEN:

--

And I was w r o n g .
And we b e l i e v e , again, the

14

court -- it was more than dicta when

it

15

indicated what the i s s u e s , the only

16

that were being remanded, w e r e .

17

not whether they sold the n a m e ; it was

18

whether they used the n a m e , used it long

19

enough to constitute

20

there was money a attributable

issues

Those

a sale, and

were

whether

to g o o d w i l l .

I f m not persuaded

21

THE COURT:

the

Court

22

of Appeals addressed

23

think they looked at my ruling as far as all

24

of the ownership being sold, and

25

said only half of it was sold, therefore

this issue at a l l .

I

-- w h i c h I

Green:
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1
2

was not a sale.
And they said it was a joint v e n t u r e ,

3

and so be it.

4

issue, and I don't think it was ever

5

before m e , as far as the n a m e .

6

I don't remember addressing
raised

I don't know this; but I p r o b a b l y

7

assumed it was sold in there, and didn't

8

consider it, because I don't remember

9

a thing about it at all.

10

the

MR. GREEN:

just

even

considering

W e l l , you k n o w , I would

11

submit it had not been addressed, but

12

I think that there's an issue w i t h regard to

13

whether the use of that name constitutes a

14

sale, regardless of how those documents

15

drafted.

16

Again, my clients were not party

17

those particular documents.

18

between IHC and Physicians, not b e t w e e n

19

p l a i n t i f f s , Rehab, and any other p a r t y .

20

That was

subject to the whims of how Rosenberg

22

drafted the documents.
THE COURT:

were

to

just
the

So we're sitting out here m o r e or

21

23

again

and

less

IHC

W e l l , and that m i g h t b e .

24

Maybe they were smart enough

-- I don't

25

this -- maybe they were smart enough,

know

they
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30
read the c o n t r a c t , read it better than I did
the first time when I went over it, and

they

noticed that, and they didn't put it in
purposefully,
d.

to get around maybe the one-

I don't know that.
MR. GREEN:

Maybe they w e r e that smart.

Then we argue

over form, your H o n o r .

substance

And, you k n o w ,

the

court can go beyond the mere documents
make a determination

MR. CAMPBELL:
THE COURT:

to

in this c a s e .

Your Honor quickly

M r . Campbell, I'd

view, to answer the question raised

--.

like
by

Mr. Green as far as the use of the name
whether that amounted
MR. CAMPBELL:

your

to constructive

and

use.

Right, your H o n o r .

At

the b e s t , at the b e s t , your H o n o r , what
counsel has just said, after admitting
his brief that the plaintiff admits
does not appear as an asset on any
generated pursuant

to the

the name
list

transaction

resulting in ownership of the Center by
joint venture

in

the

-- and this is the c o n t r a c t ,
Green: R e s p o n s i v e
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1

the c l a u s e , that's in force.

2

I submit to the court that the

four

3

m o n t h s , that's what they say in their b r i e f ,

4

"however, it is likewise undisputed

5

joint venture continued using the n a m e

6

Medicine Center' for at least four m o n t h s

7

following sale."

8
9

They never used the word

that

the

'Salt Lake

"Center;" it

was "Salt Lake Sports Medicine C e n t e r . "

10

were taking down the signs during

11

of four m o n t h s .

12

They

-- for a period

Is there any evidence, J u d g e , they

13

filed an assumed business name or that the

14

venture ever used this on billing

15

correspondence, that IHC and the P h y s i c i a n s ,

16

Paulos and Rosenberg

17

joint

s t a t e m e n t s , on

did?

There isn't any evidence of that, that

18

they ever used the name once this joint

19

was formed, or that thereafter

20

any capacity, besides just taking down the names

21

that were there and putting up their own n a m e ,

22

your Honor, which is Sports Medicine W e s t .

23

That's the n a m e ; that was the name that the joint

24

venture

25

venture

they used it in

adopted.
And when I think what the court, at

C a m p b e l l : Rebuttal
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1

both stages, has had in mind, "all" m e a n s a l l ;

2

"all of the following."

3

as transfer if purchaser acquires and p a y s

4

consideration

5

the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine C e n t e r . "

6

court

7

this contract, according to these f e l l o w s , if

8

that's the case.

"Sale should be

defined

for all the following; o w n e r s h i p

-- as the court said, we've got to

9

of

The

rewrite

And the issue, your Honor, the -- I

10

m e a n , as the court suggested, taking down

11

n a m e , is not reflective of the fact that the

12

went with the transfer.

13

If anything, that's evidence of

14

fact they didn't own it, that they w e r e n ' t

15

the n a m e .

16

that it's not part of the

17

And taking it down is

the

the
using

demonstration

transaction.

There's no evidence, your H o n o r ,

18

-- through depositions or otherwise

19

anything to indicate that this transaction

20

intentionally

21

name

--

that

there's

skewed to avoid the Rehab

contract.

That could have been -- if that

22

been done, they could of easily done i t .

23

could have dropped out the word

24

could of said, "this sale does not

25

goodwill."

was

had
They

"goodwill."

They

include
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34
1

are we going to do in two weeks?

2

try this and let the jury say no.to P a r a g r a p h 1 1 ,

3

"it doesn't really mean what it says"?

4

Are we going

Are we going to let them say,

"well,

5

apparently, even though you did n o t , we're

6

to rely upon the clause that says there's

some

7

goodwill in the sale, and there's nothing

in

8

there about the name"?

9

We're going to let the jury

going

speculate,

10

and rewrite the contract for us?

11

Honor, that isn't the way that I know this

12

conducts b u s i n e s s ,

13

T h e n , your

But I will say one thing:

That

court

the

14

Court of Appeals never touched this i s s u e . And

15

Judge, here are the b r i e f s .

16

like to see them, these are the briefs of

17

parties on appeal.

18

on appeal by M r , Green,

19

If the court

This issue was n e v e r

would
the
raised

It was never raised by the d e f e n d a n t ,

20

It was never even decided by anybody.

21

on appeal, the issues, I've asked counsel

22

cite, just give the court one suggestion

23

the Court of Appeals touched this i s s u e , and

24

didn f t.

25

to

The

points
to

where
they

They didn't even address the i s s u e , and
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Argument

1

1 I 1 f-» r e f o r e

2

We
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